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A DIVORCE WAITING TO HAPPEN
"To be neutral and unneutral at one and the same time is a legal
monstrosity."
_ Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage, 19401
"If neutrality means a crushing of world morality it is better that we
take sides and fight."
-Senator Elbert Thomas, 19392
I. INTRODUCTION: AN INTERNATIONALIST IN ISOLATIONIST TIMES
Franklin Delano Roosevelt grew up in Europe and in many
ways identified profoundly with the Old World. Former Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, a great friend of Roosevelt, wrote
"I doubt whether any American President since John Quincy Adams
has been so well versed in the diplomatic history of his own country
or so thoroughly familiar with the modem history of Europe or of
Asia. His knowledge of geography was exceptional and his grasp of
the principles of geopolitics almost instinctive."3 As a leader of
international upbringing4 who worried intensely about the fate of
Europe and China and considered their strength an extension of
American national security, the strong isolationist sentiment in the
United States during the 1930s and early 1940s inspired in Roosevelt
both sympathy and frustration. While personally deploring the horrors
I EDWIN BORCHARD & WuniAM PoTrER LAGE, NEUTRALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES
6 (2d ed. 1940).
2 Id. at 397 (quoting Sen. Elbert Thomas of Utah, author of the failed Thomas
Amendment of 1939).
3 SUMNER WELLES, SEVEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPED HISTORY 66 (195 1).
4 According to one author, Roosevelt had been to Europe eight times by his fifteenth
birthday, spoke French, German, and some Italian and Spanish, and had historical
family business ties with China. ROBERT SHOGAN, HARD BARGAIN 26, 38 (1995).
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of war, Roosevelt attempted to modernize the armed forces and
punish the increasingly outrageous aggressions of the Axis powers,
but recurrently encountered public or congressional opposition at
every turn.5 Letters and petitions demanding noninvolvement and
nonshipment of arms from college students, youth groups, and ladies
societies rained on the White House. For example, in May 1940, one
thousand Dartmouth undergraduates sent a wire to the White House
demanding: "Keep the U.S. out of war!"" Roosevelt privately called
the vocal young Americans "shrimps" for their unwillingness to
sacrifice in a noble cause, but he refused to take to the bully pulpit.7
Henry Kissinger has incisively described the national mood:
"Americans were still incapable of believing that anything outside the
Western Hemisphere could possibly affect their security. The America
of the 1920s and 1930s rejected even its own doctrine of collective
security lest it lead to involvement in the quarrels of distant, bellicose
societies. '  Roosevelt made no decisive attempt to encourage
interventionist sentiment. Instead, the men of Roosevelt's largely
internationalist administration fed on each other's frustration with
ignorant and parochial public opinion. Then-Secretary of State
5 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY, 1932-1945, at 87-90, 101 (1979); John T. Flynn, Whom Are We Getting
Ready to Fight?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1940, at 15; Letter from Samuel
McCrea Cavert, General Secretary, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in
America, to Roosevelt (Oct. 5, 1935), reprinted in 3 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRs 17, 17 (Edgar B. Nixon, ed., 1969) [hereinafter FDR & FOREIGN
AFFA Rs]; Letter from Walter W. Van Kirk, Director, National Peace Conference, to
Roosevelt (Mar. 3, 1936), reprinted in id. at 230.
6 T.R. FEHRENBAcH, F.D.R.'s UNDECLARED WAR, 1939To 1941, at 59 (1967).
See JAMEs MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 422 (1984).
Even as late as April 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull's speech proposing to
repeal the 1939 Neutrality Act elicited 600 letters in favor, but 1,100 opposing repeal.
2 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 943 (1948).
8 HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 372 (1994).
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Cordell Hull spoke for most of the administration when he likened
isolationists to "the somnambulist who walks within an inch of a
thousand-foot precipice without batting an eye."9
While the will of citizens of the United States to stay out of the
war fell only slightly between 1934 and 1941,1" their opposition to
aiding Britain - that is, the desire for United States neutrality -
plummeted after Hitler invaded Poland and continued to fall until the
Pearl Harbor attack plunged opposition to its nadir." This does not
mean that a majority of Americans ever desired active participation in
the war. The American public sympathized with the plight of the
Allies and Chinese, but feared that only neutrality would keep the
United States clear of foreign entanglements.1 On the internationalist
side of the ledger, many citizen groups lobbied for aid to countries
fighting fascists. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Allies, for instance, sent twenty-two petitions to Congress with 659
I 1 HULL, supra note 7, at 667.
30 See DALLEK, supra note 5, at 203. A 1937 poll found 95% opposition to the
United States ever entering another world war. BURNs, supra note 7, at 399. Polls
in autumn 1940 indicated 86% of those questioned opposed American entry into war.
See WILLIAM L. LANGER & S. EVERETT GLEASON, THE UNDECLARED WAR 200
(1953). A mid-January 1941 poll still showed that a very large majority of Americans
opposed entering the war directly. Id. at 254. In September, 1941, the polls still
showed 75-80% opposition to war. Id. at 732.
" See LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at 257, 291; WARREN F. KIMBALL, THE
MOST UNSORDID AcT 126, 191 (1969) (noting that in December 1940, as much as
60% of Americans questioned favored aid to Britain even at risk of war); LANGER &
GLEASON, supra note 10, at 254 (noting that by mid-January 1941, 70% of Americans
questioned favored aid to Britain even at risk of war); see also Letter from Alan Barth
to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury (April 4, 1941) (on file with
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library [hereinafter FDR Lib.]) ("Behind the
continuing popular support of aid to Britain there still lies a twofold motivation: The
American people desire the defeat of the Axis. And they desire to stay out of the
war.").
32 See generally ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE ILLUSION OF NEUTRALITY 21 (1962).
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signatures each in favor of "giving all possible aid short of war to
those who are now fighting the Dictators." 3  Others, including
celebrities like Douglas Fairbanks, sent letters, petitions, and
telegrams urging similar measures.'4 The vast majority of Americans,
including Roosevelt, believed in the effectiveness of a foreign policy
holding that - from the first loosening of the restrictions of the
Neutrality Acts until the freezing of Japanese assets in July, 1941 -
the United States could fight wars and successfully defend democracy
in Europe and Asia without the loss of a single American life. The
compromise wrought by these conflicting sentiments, unofficial aid
coupled with official neutrality, finally resulted in inadequate aid and
unneutral neutrality.
Between 1934 and 1941, Congress passed several joint
resolutions designed to curtail the President's powers to send aid to
victims of fascist aggression. Roosevelt publicly supported the early
Neutrality Acts over the objection of the Secretaries of State and
Treasury in order to please the many isolationist democrats in
Congress. 5 The New Deal required constant pressure and advocacy;
like Goring, Roosevelt was reluctant to begin a war on two fronts.
The Great Depression forced Roosevelt to concentrate his energies on
domestic affairs at the expense of foreign policy. In fact, Roosevelt
sometimes admitted that the American foreign policy was being
decided on a twenty-four hour basis.'"
Meanwhile, Roosevelt privately tried to weaken the neutrality
laws through his main congressional ally in foreign affairs, Key
"3 Letter from Conyers Read, Chairman, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies to Roosevelt (Dec. 3, 1940) (on file with the FDR Lib.).
14 See, e.g., Telegram from Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. to Roosevelt (Dec. 31, 1940) (on
file with the FDR Lib.).
" BuRNs, supra note 7, at 249.
1 See, e.g., A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, THE FAR EAsTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATEs 456 (1962).
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Pittman of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Unfortunately for Roosevelt, the alcoholic Senator
Pittman did not always reliably advance the President's interests in the
legislative arena. Beginning in 1939, Roosevelt stopped relying on
Pittman and began voicing his fears in public that legislation limiting
his powers might have the effect of dragging the country into war
rather than keeping it Out. 17  Late in 1939, Roosevelt publicly
addressed Congress on the Neutrality Act: "I regret that the Congress
passed that act. I regret equally that I signed that act." 8 Roosevelt
also feared that neutrality would indirectly aid aggressors, 9 a fear that
Winston Churchill shared.2" Churchill, however, was not afraid to
pressure Roosevelt into changing his aid policy when British funds
began to run low.21
Although Roosevelt remained skeptical of Britain's claims that
they were unable to pay for arms, he remained personally dedicated to
helping the Allies by any means possible.22 In late 1940 he realized
that Britain had exhausted its gold and foreign reserves.' He then
17 DAuEy, supra note 5, at 110; NATHAN MILLER, FDR: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 440
(1983).
8 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress in Extraordinary Session Regarding
the 1939 Neutrality Act (Sept. 21, 1939), reprinted in FRAKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
RoOSEVELT's FOREI NPOLICY, 1933-1941, at 194 (1942) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT].
19 Id. at 179, 183.
SSee Telegram from Winston Churchill [alias "Former Naval Person"] to Roosevelt
(June 15, 1940), reprinted in 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1940, at 53, 53-54 (1957) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS ].
2 See, e.g., id. at 54-55; Telegram from Winston Churchill [alias "Former Naval
Person"] to Roosevelt (May 20, 1940), reprinted in id., at 51, 51; Telegram from
Winston Churchill to Roosevelt (June 11, 1940), reprinted in id. at 52, 52; Telegram
from Winston Churchill [alias "Former Naval Person"] to Roosevelt (July 13, 1940),
reprinted in id. at 57, 57-58.
22 See KImmALL, supra note 11, at 29-30.
2 See id. at 9-10.
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redoubled his efforts to aid them - and succeeded. Often,
Roosevelt's personal desire to aid the languishing Allies resulted in
clear violations of the federal neutrality laws. This Article analyzes
how Roosevelt violated the Neutrality Acts and the Constitution prior
to the implementation of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act. While historians
typically assume without close examination that Roosevelt violated
national or international laws, this Article is the first comprehensive
attempt to analyze the legality and constitutionality of Roosevelt's
foreign affairs policy. It is not, however, this Article's purpose to
portray FDR as a lawless dictator, as did so many of his histrionic
contemporaries.24 Yet, the fact remains that Roosevelt was no stickler
for inconvenient legality; he had nothing but contempt for laws that
impeded his version ofjustice.25 As he quipped in a September, 1940
press conference: "I stopped being a lawyer twelve years ago."2 The
upshot of the clash between public or congressional shortsightedness
on the one hand, and Roosevelt's almost clairvoyant understanding of
the intentions of the fascists and his irreverence for the law on the
other hand, was that Roosevelt did not consistently obey either the
' Kg., 86 CONG. REC. 7657 (June 6, 1940) (statement of Sen. Schwellenbach). After
Roosevelt announced the destroyers-for-bases deal, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch called
Roosevelt "...America's first dictator..." BuRNs, supra note 7, at 44 1. During the
Lend-Lease Act hearings, several congressmen and senators labelled Roosevelt a
would-be "dictator." See, e.g., KiMBALL, supra note 11, at 163, 171 (quoting repeat
charges by Rep. Hamilton Fish, Republican of New York), 176 (quoting charges by
House and Senate minority reports), 179 (quoting charges by Sen. Carter Glass,
Democrat of Virginia).
2 See, e.g., Letter from Roosevelt to King George VI (Nov. 22, 1940) cited in
SHoGAN, supra note 4, 259 (deriding "legalists" in connection with destroyers-for-
bases deal).
26 SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 239.
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letter or spirit of American neutrality laws and the Constitution. 7 His
obedience to either letter or spirit was largely contingent upon the
tension between the relative isolationism of the national mood and
Roosevelt's perception of the necessity to aid the victims of fascist
aggression. Of course, history seems to have exonerated FDR, but
there is some question whether the repeated violation of the neutrality
laws and the Constitution in service of Roosevelt's worthy goals was
in any sense inevitable.
The vital issues raised by Roosevelt's conduct of foreign
affairs recur frequently - almost annually, in fact - in United States
political and constitutional debates. These issues include the
President's constitutional power to dispose of military arms and
vessels; the relative control under the Constitution of Congress and
the President over foreign relations (embracing commerce, foreign aid,
recognition of foreign belligerency, neutrality, and war); the status of
American neutrality legislation and policy; and the issue of proper
statutory interpretation. There are also significant historical issues at
stake, including Roosevelt's honesty in his dealings with the American
public and Congress, and with foreign states; and how Roosevelt's
actions illuminate his personality as a leader. This Article examines
these issues in detail by reviewing Roosevelt's implementation (or
nonimplementation, as the case may be) of United States neutrality
law from 1935 until 1941.
' In fact, the whole question of whether Roosevelt obeyed the letter of the neutrality
laws may be moot considering the President's claim to have plenary powers in the
foreign relations sphere. In other words, I will discuss below the question of whether
Congress' attempts to bridle the President's powers over foreign commerce were
unconstitutional.
1996-97]
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II. THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE
WORLD WAR II
The United States has a long history of neutrality dating back
to only a few years after the nation's founding. Demands for
neutrality intensified after the tragedy of World War I. The
accelerated development of neutrality statutes in that period came
partly from a desire to avoid repeating what some saw as Woodrow
Wilson's mistaken foreign entanglements, and was partly a response
to the industrial revolution and its corresponding increase in
transnational trade. During a war, Congress believed, a nonparty that
trades with one belligerent could provoke the other. In the years
between the world wars, Congress passed several neutrality statutes
with the intention of avoiding being dragged into war through trade.28
Major neutrality laws were passed or amended in 1935, 1936, 1937,
and 1939. In addition, earlier neutrality statutes (such as the 1917
Espionage Act) were still in on the books in the 1930s and early
1940s, and Congress passed other laws with neutrality provisions
(such as the Act of June 28, 1940).
2 Neutrality Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 4, 4 (1939) (stating in preamble desire of United
States to preserve neutrality and avoid involvement in foreign wars); see also Divine,
supra note 12, at 76-77; cf Suspine v. Compania Transatlantica Centroamericana, 37
F. Supp. 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ("[T]he very purpose of [The 1939 Neutrality
Act] is to preserve the neutrality of the United States and avert the risks which brought
us into [World War I]."); Memorandum from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to
Roosevelt 3-4 (Dec. 11, 1937) (on file with FDR Lib.) (purpose of 1937 Neutrality
Act is inter alia to avoid entanglement in foreign war).
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A. The 1917 Espionage Act
Congress did not discuss the 1917 Espionage Act29 in the
1930s beyond passively listening to expert testimony. However, that
Act was still valid until 1941, and parts of it continued in effect well
beyond 1941. Although the Espionage Act was originally drafted to
apply to World War I, it had two provisions relevant to Roosevelt's
actions prior to American entry into World War II. Title V of the Act,
entitled "Enforcement of Neutrality," states:
SEC. 3. During a war in which the United States is a
neutral nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the
jurisdiction of the United States any vessel built,
armed, or equipped as a vessel of war, or converted
from a private vessel into a vessel of war, with any
intent or under any agreement or contract, written or
oral, that such vessel shall be delivered to a belligerent
nation, or to an agent, officer, or citizen of such
nation, or with reasonable cause to believe that the
said vessel shall or will be employed in the service of
any such belligerent nation after its departure from the
jurisdiction of the United States.30
Section 6 of Title V provides for criminal penalties for any violation
of Section 3.
Worth noting is Section 3's passive wording. Because of the
lack of grammatical subject, Title V, Section 3 causes it to apply to
' Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). Congress amended the 1917
Espionage Act in 1940 to provide for stiffer penalties. Amendment to 1917
Espionage Act, ch. 72, 54 Stat. 79 (1940).
30 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 222 (1917).
1996-97]
424 BUFFALO JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol.3
any individual, corporation, or government agency or official. The
Act makes it unlawful for anybody or anything to "send out of the
jurisdiction of the United States any vessel .... " This includes the
President or the Departments of the Navy and War. The effect of
Section 3 is to completely bar the sale, loan, or gift, direct or indirect,
of any ship or vessel by anyone in the United States to any belligerent.
Although at the time the Espionage Act was passed the word "vessel"
probably was not contemplated to include airplanes, the sale, loan, or
transfer of airplanes would at least seem to violate the spirit of the
Act.
B. The 1934 Johnson Act
The year 1934 was a busy one for foreign policy legislation.
Among the laws passed to preserve American neutrality was the
Johnson Bill,31 which made it a crime for any person to make loans or
sell bonds to governments that had defaulted on prior loans to the
United States. Defaulting countries included France, England, and
Greece, but not Finland, China, or the USSR. Roosevelt supported
the Bill, at the time, to strengthen his political backing among
Republicans.32 This would prove cumbersome when World War II
erupted, as it prevented the President from allowing private loans that
would let Britain or France buy American arms. Section 2 of the Act
excluded United States government corporations, including those
created by special authorization of Congress, from the definition of
parties forbidden to make loans. Thus, government-to-government
loans were still possible if Congress would allow them.
A few weeks after the passage of the Act a number of
problems arose in interpretation, and Treasury Secretary Morgenthau
31 ch. 112,48 Stat. 574 (1934).
32 See DALLEK, supra note 5, at 74.
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arranged a conference between himself, Senator Johnson, Attorney
General Robert Jackson, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April
27, 1934. At that meeting, Senator Johnson specified that the statute
was not meant to apply to quotidien commercial instruments such as
time drafts or banker's acceptances.33 Thus, the Johnson Act only
prohibited large scale private loans; ordinary international commercial
instruments and government loans remained legally possible.
C. The Neutrality Acts, 1935-1939
1. The 1935 Neutrality Act
Throughout 1935 Italy was preparing to invade Abyssina in
full view of the League of Nations and the rest of the world. Fearing
that the country could be dragged into war by arming the
belligerents, 3 Congress passed the first Neutrality Act by joint
resolution, which Roosevelt signed on August 31.3' The 1935
Neutrality Act gave the President for the first time a legal basis to
institute a general system for controlling arms exports.36 Specifically,
it required that "upon the outbreak or during the progress of war
between, or among, two or more states," the President must proclaim
the state of war and "it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms,
13 Memorandum from E.H. Foley, Acting General Counsel to the Treasury
Department, to Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, attachment at 3 (Dec.
12, 1940) (on file with FDR Lib.).
m DONALD F. DRUMMOND, THE PASSING OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1937-1941, at
44 (1955).
11 Neutrality Act of 1935, ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (1935).
36 The law did have a recent precedent. In 1934, Congress had passed a joint
resolution designed to allow the President to prohibit arms sales to countries involved
in the Spanish conflict if in his opinion such an embargo would help establish peace.
ch. 365,48 Stat. 811 (1934).
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ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United
States, or possessions of the United States, to any port of such
belligerent states" or to the port of a neutral state for transshipment. 7
It also established the interdepartmental National Munitions Control
Board under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, who was to
administer the arms export control provisions of the Act. To
implement these regulations, the Act required all persons engaged in
the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms to
register with the Secretary of State; it authorized the Secretary of
State to promulgate rules and regulations to administer and enforce
the new arms export controls and authorized the President to
designate a list of articles subject to these controls; and it established
universal licensing requirements for all arms imports and exports.38
Although the State Department had sought such statutory authority
for arms export control independent of neutrality legislation, it moved
quickly to establish a control regime under its new mandate. On
September 19, 1935, Secretary of State Hull established the Office of
Arms and Munitions Control to exercise the functions vested in him
under the law.
Although the Act required, in mandatory language, that the
President "shall" proclaim a state of war between two or more
countries where such a state exists, he "may" extend the resulting
embargo to any belligerents who entered after the war had erupted.39
Moreover, Congress left it up to the President's judgment to
determine when to withdraw the embargo.40 But the President's
discretion to determine which exports were subject to embargo was
limited by the terminology, "arms, ammunition, and implements of
31 Neutrality Act of 1935, cl. 837, 49 Stat. at 1081.
38 Id. §2, 49 Stat. at 1082-83.
39 Id. at 1081.
40 Id. at 1082-83.
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war." This list did not include the wider term "munitions of war" and,
as a result, Secretary of State Hull informed Roosevelt that he had no
legal discretion to embargo processed metals, raw materials,
petroleum products, or foodstuffs."' Roosevelt pursued a policy
consistent with this interpretation.42
While Roosevelt did not resist the passage of the 1935
Neutrality Act, he did privately oppose its limitations. His words at
the signing were mostly conciliatory; he approved of the legislation's
goal of keeping the United States out of war. Roosevelt said. "[t]he
purpose is wholly excellent, and this joint resolution will to a
considerable degree serve that end. 43 On the other hand, he warned
prophetically that limiting the President's flexibility could have
unforeseeable consequences. "It is conceivable that situations may
arise in which the wholly inflexible provisions of Section I of this act
might have exactly the opposite effect from that which was intended.
In other words, the inflexible provisions might drag us into war
instead of keeping us out.""
2. The 1936 Neutrality Act
The 1936 Neutrality Act45 essentially re-enacted the 1935 Act
with added provisions prohibiting loans or security sales to
4, Radiogram from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, to Roosevelt (Oct. 11,
1935), reprinted in 3 FDR & FoReIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 19.
42 See Letter from Roosevelt to Rev. W. Russell Bowie, Rector, Grace Church (Oct.
30, 1935), reprinted in id. at 43; Letter from Roosevelt to J. David Stem, Publisher,
The New York Post (Dec. 11, 1935), reprinted in id. at 121.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement of the President on Signing the 1935 Neutrality
Act (Aug. 31, 1935), reprinted in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN
POLICY, 1933-1941, at 76 (1942).
44 Id.
4' Neutrality Act of 1936, ch. 106, 49 Stat. 1152 (1936).
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belligerents, regardless of whether they were in default of a war
debt.' In addition, through its influence on the drafters of 1936 Act,
the Roosevelt Administration managed to engineer a minor change in
wording, from the 1935 Act's mandate that "upon the outbreak of war
. ..the President shall proclaim" a state of war, to the 1936 Act's
softer mandate that "[w]henever the President shall find that there
exists a state of war.. ." he must apply an embargo. This change in
wording seemed to grant the President some unspecified (but probably
small) amount of discretion in determining when a state of war
existed. Beginning in 1936, Roosevelt would intentionally
misconstrue this wording as granting him literally unlimited discretion
in determining whether two or more states were at war.
The new Act also stated that the President "shall," as opposed
to "may," extend the embargo to any states that enter the war, and
"shall" again revoke the proclamation when he judges that a state of
war no longer exists. 7 The provisions expanded the principle of
neutrality well beyond what international law or American traditions
required;48 the new law really amounted to an abrogation of United
States participation in punishing violations of international law, and of
any responsibility to help victims of unjust hostilities. "As the
aggressors bestrode Europe, America abolished the distinction
46 Id. § I a, 54 Stat. at 1153.
47 Id. 54 Stat. at 1152.
48 See 2 OPPENHEMI'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 543 (Hersh Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed.
1935) ("[l]t does not, according to the International Law of the present day, constitute
a violation of neutrality for a neutral to allow his subjects to supply either belligerent
with arms and ammunition in the ordinary way of trade."); C-ARLES G. FENWICK,
AMERiCANNEuRALITY: TRIAL AND FAi.uRE 115 (1940) ("[T]he neutrality legislation
of the United States has on the whole been stricter in its prohibitions than the
international law of neutrality has required."); cf id. at 122-23 (reciting neutrality in
American history that permitted sales of arms to both belligerents). For an excellent
discussion of the historical tradition of American neutrality, see generally DIvINE,
supra note 12, chs. I & 2.
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between aggressor and victim by legislating a single set of restrictions
on both."'49 Like the 1935 Act, the 1936 Act did not grant the
President discretionary power to embargo munitions of war
(petroleum products, processed metals, machinery, etc.) other than
arms. This would have been useful in the Italian-Abyssinian conflict
where United States companies were supplying Mussolini with much
of the manufactures and raw materials other than arms that he needed
to wage war.
Because of the wording of the 1936 Act, its provisions did not
apply to internal wars. Thus, when "civil war" broke out in Spain in
the summer of 1936, the President had a free hand under national and
international law to aid the democratically-elected Spanish
government against Franco's fascist-backed insurgents. He did not.
Instead, he sought and received from Congress a statute that made it
a crime to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war to Spain,
directly or indirectly.' The purpose of this Act5" was to prevent U.S.
involvement in the war that would, Congress thought, inevitably
spread abroad since foreign powers were aiding both sides. Senator
Pittman, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations - with
the backing of the Roosevelt administration - declared that "both
forces are receiving arms, without blockade of their ports, from
various powerful countries of the world. Both forces are being
augmented by the soldiers of other powerful European countries."52
Strictly speaking, Pittman's assertion was not true; no European
"soldiers" entered into the Spanish civil war on the side of the
Republican government. Some civilian volunteers - American as
4 KISSINGER, supra note 8, at 378.
so See DRUMMOND, supra note 34, at 45. In fact, this embargo consistituted an
interference with Spain's internal affairs in that it directly aided the insurgents. Such
an embargo arguably violated international law.
I Neutrality Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 3 (1937).
52 See 81 CONG. REc. 74 (1937) (statement of Sen. Pittman).
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well as European - did fight in support of the Republican
government, but they hardly qualified as "soldiers of... powerful
European countries." Actually, Pittman and the Roosevelt
Administration made these arguments to create an excuse for their
morally and legally questionable policy of allowing Germany and Italy
a free hand to flout international law and wage undeclared war on
Spain.
3. The 1937 Neutrality Act
Congress passed even stronger legislation in 1937 that the
New York Herald Tribune mockingly called "An Act to Preserve the
United States from Intervention in the War of 1914-18."" 3 The
lengthy 1937 Neutrality Act amended the 1935 Neutrality Act to
include countries engaged in civil strife (targeted obviously at
Spain).54 Like the 1936 Neutrality Act, the 1937 Act required the
President to extend the embargo to states engaged in war, and to
revoke the proclamation where a state of war no longer existed. This
provision was softened by a change that kept the sale by private
companies of goods other than implements of war on a "cash-and-
carry" basis legal until the President determined that such sales would
endanger peace in the United States.55 However, this provision did
not allow government arms sales under any circumstances. For the
sake of clarity, the Act explicitly stated what the 1935 Act implied -
that the President's power to determine which goods constitute
53 SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 45.
54 Neutrality Act of 1937, ch. 146, §1, 50 Stat. 121, 121 (1937). Several members
of the Senate, including Pittman, had expressed a desire to generalize the 1936
embargo against Spain to apply to all countries engaged in a civil war. 81 CONG. REC.
74-79 (1937).
" Neutrality Act of 1937, ch. 146, 50 Stat. at 122.
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munitions did not apply to sales of raw materials,56 thereby clearly
denying that the President had any discretion to declare oil, food,
steel, and other raw materials to be "implements of war."
Like the 1936 Act, the 1937 Act forbade loans and security
sales to belligerents, granting the President power to make certain
exceptions.57 The Act also contained several important new
provisions. It forbade American ships from transporting arms of any
state to a belligerent"; it forbade the use of American ports and
territorial waters by belligerent submarines or armed merchant vessels
where the President has deemed such use threatening to American
peace; and lastly, it forbade American merchant vessels engaging in
trade with belligerents to arm themselves.59
The 1937 Act, like its immediate predecessor, granted the
President some small discretion in determining when a state of war
existed, although once he had determined that a state of war existed
he was bound to apply the statute. Unlike the 1935 Neutrality Act
that it amended, the 1937 Neutrality Act's embargo on arms,
ammunition, and implements of war did not expire the following year.
Congress evidently intended the provisions of Section 1 to endure in
the absence of renewing legislation. On the other hand, Section 2,
which gave the President discretion to restrict the shipment of other
goods not qualifying as implements of war, did self-terminate on May
1, 1939.6' In order to prevent the President's cash-and-carry
discretion from expiring, Senator Thomas of Utah compromised by
56 See id., at 121-22.
5 See id., at 123-24.
5 See id., at 126.
5 See id., at 127. Actually, this provision is quite weak considering that the United
States was required to forbid belligerent vessels from entering U.S. ports under the
1907 Hague Convention. Hague Convention (XIII) Respecting the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers in Naval War, art. 6, 1 Bevans 723, Oct. 18, 1907.
60 See NEuTRALrrY AcT oF 1937, § 2(e), ch. 146, 50 Stat. at 123.
1996-97]
432 BUFFALO JOURNAL OFINTERNA TIONAL LAW [Vol. 3
introducing an amendment of Section 2 in early 1939 that added a
blanket provision making the export of "essential war materials"
unlawful.61 However, the Thomas Resolution also gave the President
enough discretion to exempt a state that had been attacked by a treaty
violator so long as that state had not itself violated a treaty. In other
words, it gave the President discretion to punish states that violated
international law, potentially provoking retribution. A majority in
Congress rejected the Thomas Amendment on those grounds.62
4. The 1939 Neutrality Act
Although he never abandoned his public commitment to the
policy of neutrality Roosevelt was actively and publicly opposing the
continuance of the 1937 Neutrality Act by the time the Act came
before Congress for renewal.63 Roosevelt's weak position on the
subject of neutrality presented no obstacle to Congress, which
renewed the Act anyway. Not entirely defeated, Roosevelt signed it
into law. Compared to the 1937 Neutrality Act, the 1939 Neutrality
Act" seemed stricter but actually had few canines. While substantially
similar to the 1937 Act, 65 the 1939 Act changed the "cash-and-carry"
provision to forbid any American vessel (including airplanes) to carry
61 See Borchard & Lage, supra note 1, at 396.
62 See id. at 396, 398.
63 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Regarding the 1939
Neutrality Act (July 14, 1939), reprinted in ROOSEVELT, supra note 18, at 173, 173-
78; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress in Extraordinary Session Regarding
the 1939 Neutrality Act (Sept. 21, 1939), reprinted in id. at 192, 193-98.
64 NEUTRALITY AcT OF 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. § 441 etseq. (1995)). Portions of the 1939 Neutrality Act are still valid law
today.
' For example, the 1939 Act had the same provisions as the 1937 Act relating to the
prohibition on loans and sales of securities, the submarines and armed merchant
vessels, and the National Munitions Control Board.
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any materials, articles, or passengers whatever to belligerent states,
although Americans could still market to belligerents through foreign
shippers.' The effect of the law was to forbid United States merchant
ships from risking being sunk by belligerents. Congress knew that the
sinking of a harmless American ship could force the United States to
confront the responsible belligerents and, as a result, potentially
involve the nation in war. However, Roosevelt managed to convince
Congress to also alter the "cash-and-carry" provision to allow the sale
of arms for cash by private companies.67
Congress loosened other provisions of the 1939 Act as well.
The Act required the President to issue a proclamation of neutrality
only when "it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the
peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the
United States."68 Thus, when the President deemed that American
neutrality might damage peace or American security by allowing
fascist forces to win an important battle, the Act implicitly authorized
him to allow sales of arms to the nonfascist state. This gave him a
great deal of latitude in applying the Act, especially considering his
views, examined below, that neutrality could drag the United States
into a much more serious war than selling armaments to one side. On
the other hand, the 1939 Act required, in mandatory language, that
whenever the state of war "shall have ceased to exist" the President
must revoke the proclamation.69
In addition, the 1939 Act continued the loan and securities ban
of the 1937 Act, but made an exception for ordinary commercial
credits and short-term obligations. 7 Because the Treasury had
" NEuTRALrry ACT OF 1939, ch. 2, § 2(c), 54 Stat.at 4.
67 For a good general discussion of Roosevelt's efforts to repeal or relax the
restrictions of the Neutrality Act in 1939, see Divine, supra note 12, at 286-335.
68 NEtrrRALrry Acr OF 1939, ch. 2, § 1(a), 54 Stat. at 4.
69 Id.
70 Id. § 7(a), 54 Stat.at 8.
1996-97] 433
434 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 3
recorded a statement of Senator Johnson clarifying this aspect of the
Johnson Act,7 there was no serious question of whether the ordinary
commercial credits provision of the 1939 Act conflicted with the
Johnson Act.
The 1939 Act repealed the 1937 Neutrality Act, but did not
itself have any provisions for self-termination.72 Congress intended
the Act to continue until it purposely chose to repeal it, which in some
respects it did in 1941. By joint resolution of November 17, 1941,
Congress repealed all the major substantive limitations on the
President's power instituted by the 1939 Neutrality Act73 in order to
give him more room to implement the Lend-Lease Act. However,
some provisions of the 1939 Act remained in place even after 1941,
such as the Section 7 prohibition on private loans and securities sales.
D. The Walsh Amendment
Congress passed one final act relevant to neutrality in 1940.
The Act of June 28, 1940, entitled "An Act to Expedite National
Defense, And for Other Purposes," was originally drafted to fund
increased naval shipbuilding. However, Senator David Walsh of
Massachusetts tacked on Section 14 (subsequently called the "Walsh
Amendment"). While the Act of June 28, 1940 mainly provided for
advanced payments to defense contractors,74 the Walsh Amendment
added:
71 See supra text accompanying note 33.
72 NEutrALrTY ACT OF 1939, ch. 2, § 19, 54 Stat. at 12.
' Joint Resolution to Repeal Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939, and
For Other Purposes, 55 Stat. 764 (1941).
74 54 Stat. 676 (1940) [hereinafter I will refer to § 14 of this Act as the "Walsh
Amendment"].
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(a) Notwithstanding the provision of any other law, no
military or naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft,
munitions, supplies, or equipment, to which the United
States has title .. shall hereinafter be exchanged,
sold, or otherwise disposed of in any manner
whatsoever unless the Chief of Naval Operations in the
case of naval material, and the Chief of Staff of the
Army in the case of military material, shall first certify
that such material is not essential to the defense of the
United States.
(b) The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy as the case may be are hereby requested and
directed to furnish or cause to be furnished to the
respective chairmen of the Committees on Military
Affairs and the Committees on Naval Affairs of the
Senate and house of Representatives a copy of each
contract, order, or agreement covering exchange of
deteriorated, unserviceable, obsolescent, or surplus
military or navla equipment, munitions, or supplies
exchanged for other military or naval equipment,
munitions or supplies, and a copy of each contract,
order, or agreement shall be furnished regarding any
other disposition of military or naval equipment,
munitions and supplies by which the title passes, either
de jure or de facto, from the United States, or by
which delivery of material thereunder is deferred,
where the original cost of such military or naval
equipment, munitions or supplies exceeded or exceeds
$2,000. The copies of each contract, order, or
agreement herein referred to shall be transmitted to the
respective chairmen of the committees not later than
twenty-four hours after such contract, order or
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agreement is made, and the chairman of each
committee shall consider such contracts, orders or
agreements confidential unless a majority of members
of his committee shal direct the particular transaction
to be made public.
(c) Nothing herein shall be construed to repeal or
modify Sections 3 and 6, Title V of the Act approved
June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 222; U.S.C., Title 18, Secs. 33
and 36)."5
In summary, the Amendment first requires the Chief of Staff of the
Army and the Chief of Naval Operations to certify that any weapons,
ships, aircraft, munitions, or supplies leaving possession of the United
States in any manner are, indeed, surplus and obsolete. The
Amendment next requires the Secretary of Navy or Army Chief of
Staff to expeditiously furnish Congress with a report of any
transactions that fit the above description. Finally, the Act specifically
denies any construction that would amount to a repeal or modification
of the Title V provisions of the 1917 Espionage Act that outlawed
sending out of the United States any vessel of war with the intent or
knowledge that a belligerent would receive that vessel.76
E. Analysis of American Neutrality Law and Legislative Intent
As the President correctly interpreted the legislative intent,
Congress passed the various Neutrality Acts in response to public
fears of American involvement in foreign wars. Indeed, during 1930s
and early 1940s politicians rarely mentioned the word "neutrality"
without in the same breath including a reference to "keeping us out of
" Id. § 14, at 681 (emphasis added).
76 Id. § 14(c), at 681.
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war." Even where Congress allowed the President some modicum of
discretion in the Acts, the prevention of American involvement in war
motivated the changes. The 1939 Neutrality Act, for example, only
allowed the President the discretion "necessary to promote the
security or preserve the peace of the United States." Congress
probably relied on public opinion to keep Roosevelt's use of discretion
in check. It would have been naive, however, for Congress to assume
that either itself or the public could adequately monitor Roosevelt's
compliance with the laws. Moreover, Congress could not have
entrusted Roosevelt with such discretion, and expect him to comply,
if it had understood the intensity of his desire to help Great Britain
resist the Nazis.
Just as one can distinguish between immediate intent (the
intent to walk) and ultimate intent (the intent to get to work by
walking) in a human being, one can theoretically distinguish between
the intent of a statute and Congress' ultimate goal in passing the
statute. Congress' immediate intent in passing its neutrality laws from
1917 to 1939 was the preservation of American neutrality," but the
ultimate goal was to avoid entanglement in foreign wars.78 However,
in drafting the Neutrality Acts, Congress misunderstood how foreign
trade and aid might lead to American involvement in foreign wars.
"' See Letter and Enclosure from R. Walton Moore, Acting Secretary of State, to
Roosevelt (Dec. 15, 1936), reprinted in 3 FDR & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at
539, 543-44 (stating Senate's and public's obsession with "real neutrality" to
exclusion of consideration of best method to create peace).
See H.R REP. No. 320,75th Cong., I st Sess. 3 (1937) (discussing 1937 Neutrality
Act, H. Res. 242); cf I HuLL, supra note 7, at 415 (quoting his draft of President's
press statement after 1935 Neutrality Act: "I have approved this joint resolution
because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the
people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war.").
Moreover, the 1939 Neutrality Act was entitled "Joint Resolution to Preserve the
Neutrality and the Peace of the United States and To Secure the Safety of Its Citizens
and Their Interests."
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Congress ignored two ways in which American neutrality can
ultimately lead to prolonged involvement in foreign wars. The first
way is that an American declaration of neutrality and its resultant
embargo might provoke a hostile nation into attacking the United
States. For example, even if the United States had embargoed oil to
China and Japan neutrally, Japan might have attacked United States
territories or bases in 1941 in its quest to secure an oil supply
elsewhere. Understanding the second way requires more foresight.
The United States had already acquired enormous industrial potential
by the 1930s. By applying an impartial embargo, as Roosevelt later
argued, neutrality "may operate unevenly and unfairly - and may
actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim."79 If the
victims were to lose to ruthless aggressors, the victorious belligerents
could gradually gain the industrial power - by supplementing their
own production with the production of conquered states - and
geographical positioning - by occupying strategic bases previously
controlled by the conquered states - that would allow them to attack
and overwhelm the neutral United States.8" Thus, Roosevelt warned
Congress and the country when signing the 1935 Neutrality Act that
the application of inflexible rules of foreign policy might "drag us into
war instead of keeping us out.""1  In July 1939, regarding the
forthcoming review of the 1937 Neutrality Act, his words were much
79 SELIG ADLER, THE ISOLATIONIST IMPULSE, ITs TWENTIETH-CENTURY REACTION 248
(1957) (quoting FDR).
' See Letter from Frederick H. Allen to Roosevelt (Jan. 3, 1936), reprinted in 3 FDR
& Foreign Affairs, supra note 5, at 156, 157 (arguing to Roosevelt: "is it not better to
give power to the President to try to prevent a war, than to give him the right to
exercise certain powers to prevent the war from spreading to our own shores and so
disturbing our peace and safety?"); cf FENWICK, supra note 48, at v-vi (arguing that
attitude of neutrality might prevent a state from preparing for its own defense were it
attacked by "law-breaking" state).
s See supra text accompanying note 44.
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stronger: "Those who urge the retention of the present embargo
continue to advance the view that it will keep this country out of war
- thereby misleading the American people to rely upon a false and
illogical delusion as a means of keeping out of war."82 At least by
1940 the public appears to have understood why, as a Gallup Poll
indicated. Over sixty percent of the American people believed that
Germany would eventually fight the United States if it beat the
Allies.83
Thus, because declaring neutrality could lead to prolonged
involvement in foreign wars more quickly than early intervention, the
Neutrality Acts created a fundamental tension between the stated
intent of the Acts - to preserve American neutrality, and Congress'
ultimate intent - to avoid American entanglement in foreign wars.
By equating neutrality with noninvolvement in foreign wars, Congress
made it impossible for the Executive to fulfill both the stated intent of
the Neutrality Acts and the ultimate goals of Congress and the
American public. This tension, in turn, gave Roosevelt a ready
justification for either invocation or noninvocation of the Act when
undeclared war or other hostilities broke out. If he decided that
invoking a Neutrality Act would primarily hurt the aggressor (for
example, if the United States only traded with the aggressor and not
with the victim state), he could use his statutory discretion to proclaim
that the parties had entered a state of war - albeit undeclared - and
cause an embargo. Alternatively, if he decided that invoking a
Neutrality Act would prevent American trade from aiding a victim of
aggression, he could claim that if he proclaimed the existence of a
state of war in the absence of a declaration by either party, it might
2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Regarding the 1939 Neutrality Act
(July 14, 1939), reprinted in Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 173, 174.
3 Gallup and Fortune Polls, 4 PuB. OPINION Q. 101, 101-102 (1940); SHOGAN,
supra note 4, at 22.
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provoke one of the parties. Such a declaration, Roosevelt could
argue, would conflict with Congress' intent of keeping the United
States out of foreign wars. As I will show, Roosevelt used the laws
for both these purposes to very unneutral effect.
III. ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1935-1939
From early in his first term, President Roosevelt had promised
the country that the United States would remain neutral in and
uninvolved with any foreign wars.84 When general war broke out in
Europe on September 3, 1939, Roosevelt addressed the public by
radio that same night, declaring the neutrality of the United States
while subtly trying to encourage interventionist sentiment. "At this
moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American
neutrality. This would have been done even if there had been no
neutrality statute on the books, for this proclamation is in accordance
with international law and in accordance with American policy. This
[speech] will be followed by a proclamation required by the existing
Neutrality Act. And I trust that in the days to come our neutrality can
be made a true neutrality."85 Roosevelt thereby acknowledged his
duty to call a spade a spade, to recognize publicly a state of war when
it was too overt to deny and to preserve the "true" impartiality of the
United States. In fact, this was the first time since Italy invaded
Abyssinia that the President had declared the existence of a war
despite the obvious fact that various wars had been raging in Spain,
Italy, and Germany; China and Japan; and the Soviet Union, the Baltic
states, Poland, and Finland at various periods during the previous six
" See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at the San Diego Exposition (Oct. 2,
1935), reprinted in Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 78, 79; supra text accompanying
note 43.
85 FDR's FIRESIDE CHATS 149 (Russell D. Buhite & David W. Levy eds., 1993).
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years. It is particularly ironic that Roosevelt used the phrase "a true
neutrality," since those are precisely the words in which Germany
demanded in 1915 that the United States stop its "one-sided [trade]
supply" of arms to Great Britain86 - a one-sided supply with which,
as I will relate, the United States was in 1940 to unapologetically
provide Britain. Indeed, "a true neutrality" was the last thing
Roosevelt wanted, for it would prevent American aid to the
outgunned Allies. He betrayed his true wishes in persuading Congress
to progressively loosen the Neutrality Acts, and by using his recovered
trading authority to assist Great Britain and other victims of
aggression.
Roosevelt was a sly and usually effective leader. He wanted
not only to appear to comply with law and echo national sentiment, he
desired to shape it as well. He knew that a change in the national
mood toward interventionism would help him pressure Congress to
abandon a strictly neutral stance and engage in the commercial
favoritism characteristic of the Lend-Lease Act. "This nation will
remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain
neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account
of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or close his
conscience,"" he hinted. "When peace has been broken anywhere, the
peace of all countries everywhere is in danger. . . . Passionately
though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every
word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every
battle that is fought, does affect the American future.""8 These are not
the words of an isolationist or a true neutral.
In fact, if Roosevelt was correct that "an Allied victory was
FENWicK, supra note 48, at 123.
87 FDR's FIRESIDE CHATS, supra note 85, at 150-5 1.
8 Id. at 149.
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essential to the security of the United States." '89 By supplying Britain
with arms the United States would be indirectly defending itself.
Roosevelt personally believed this and, as a Gallup poll demonstrated,
so did almost two-thirds of the American public." In his public
addresses, Roosevelt consistently and masterfully redefined the
meaning of sending aid to the Allies. Aid to victims of fascist attacks
was not only in the interests of charity and justice. It promoted
national security. As he declared during a December 17, 1940, press
conference, "it is . . . important from a selfish point of view of
American defense, that we should do everything to help the British
Empire to defend itself."' He failed to mention that this goal
conflicted with his earlier declaration that the United States would
"remain a neutral nation." In this contest between the "neutrality" and
"linked British-United States self-defense" strains in Roosevelt's
rhetoric, neutrality was sure to lose.
A. The Spanish "Civil War"
Because Roosevelt wished to aid the Allies and China
unimpeded, he persistently refused to apply the neutrality laws to
Germany, Italy, and Japan. This motive was lacking in the case of the
Spanish "Civil War." The Spanish Civil War gave Roosevelt his first
opportunity to apply a neutrality statute. It was common knowledge
that Germany and Italy funded Franco's rebellion in Spain and had
even sent troops and ordered ships and planes to attack Spanish cities.
In fact, the Japanese Minister said that the United States was
1 HULL, supra note 7, at 766.
0 See 4 PUB. OPINION Q., supra note 83, at 101-102.
9' Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference on Dec. 17, 1940, reprinted in FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
604, 604 (Samuel Irving Rosenman ed. 1941) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS &
ADDRESSES].
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"probably the only nation that is strictly adhering to an honest
neutrality" in Spain.' Still, Roosevelt refused to admit that Spain was
at war per se with Italy and Germany. Because the 1936 and 1937
Neutrality Acts required that the President institute an embargo once
he had proclaimed the existence of a state of war, Roosevelt simply
declined to declare that Germany and Italy were at war with Spain.
9 3
Such a declaration would have required embargoes against Germany
and Italy as well as Spain, thereby opening the possibility of provoking
the two aggressors and bringing down the full furor of public
isolationist sentiment on the administration. Moreover, private
American entrepreneurs would be denied the opportunity to sell arms
to the Spanish government. In any case, because Germany and Italy
were not fully "at war" with Spain, Roosevelt's use of his statutory
discretion arguably seems justified. Roosevelt also cherished the
notion of negotiating a peace in Europe, and he believed that
provoking the fascist states would have possibly compromised that
end. Of course this did not excuse Roosevelt from applying the law
impartially, but the circumstances left enough room for doubt as to
whether a state of war between Germany-Italy and Spain existed. In
any case, the Neutrality in Case of Civil War Act eventually made
clear that Congress intended to avoid involvement in that particular
conflict regardless of whether an embargo would discriminate against
' Letter from Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador in Spain, to Cordell Hull, U.S.
Secretary of State, and William Phillips, U.S. Under Secretary of State (Oct. 30,
1936), reprinted in 3 FDR & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 465,465.
' DALLEK, supra note 5, at 142-43. The United States's refusal to sell arms to the
Spanish government probably violated international law as well. Secretary Hull
readily admitted states faced with internal insurgencies had the right to purchase arms
from other states without discriminatory embargo, but pleaded weakly that a fear of
involvement in war -justified or not - somehow excused the execution of a state's
international obligations. See 1 HULL, supra note 7, at 513-14.
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the Spanish government.94 Roosevelt dutifully forbade the export of
arms to Spain.95 Roosevelt was at least partially to blame for the
Spanish embargo, which hastened the downfall of the Republican
government and brought Franco to power. Rather than seeking
congressional approval to aid the republican government, he instead
solicited a law that amounted to an abdication of American
responsibility to enforce international law. He thereby contributed to
a denial of international law qua law and of morality in the world
public order, and to the overthrow of the Spanish government, which
the United States itself had long recognized as legitimate.
It is noteworthy, though, that Roosevelt sought and obtained
legislation from Congress before implementing any Spanish embargo
not authorized, in his estimation, by prior law. Whatever Roosevelt's
duties were under international law, he showed respect for Congress'
power over foreign commerce in this instance. But this respect for
Congress only lasted as long as Roosevelt found it convenient.
B. Italy Invades Abyssinia
Whatever Roosevelt's reasons for his official apathy to the
cause of Spanish democracy, he did not repeat his performance when
Italy invaded Abyssinia (subsequently renamed Ethiopia) in 193 5. The
origins of the conflict were supposedly temporally distant. One of the
sore spots in Italian history was the devastating defeat of the Italian
army by the relatively crude Abyssinian forces in Adowa. Mussolini
thought the best way to consolidate his own power would be to play
to Italian nationalism by avenging Adowa forty years after the fact.9
9 See Neutrality Act of 1936, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Proclamation No. 2236 Forbidding Export of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements
of War to Spain 50 Stat. 1831 (May 1, 1937).
' See I WINSTON S. CIRtRCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 149 (1976).
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In October, 1935, ilDuce used a December 1934 border skirmish at
Wal Wal as a pretext to wage undeclared war against Abyssinia, and
he conquered and annexed it in May 1936."7 At the beginning of the
attack Roosevelt, knowing that Italy could not retaliate against the
United States, announced American neutrality in accordance with the
1935 Act." He later publicly acknowledged his duty to declare a state
of war in spite of the fact neither side had issued a declaration of
war."9 The major advantage of the 1935 Neutrality Act was that,
since Abyssinia could not afford U.S. arms in the first place, the
embargo affected Italy alone. The disadvantage was that Italy could
still purchase food for troops, steel, oil, and other nonlethal war-
related supplies because Roosevelt could not legally include them in
the embargo. To ameliorate this effect, Roosevelt tried
(unsuccessfully) to persuade American businesses to refrain on moral
grounds from doing business with Italy."° Secretary of State Cordell
Hull reinforced the moral embargo by classifying oil, copper, trucks,
tractors, scrap iron, and scrap steel as "essential war materials,"
9 See Iid. at 97.
9 Proclamation No. 2141 Prohibiting the Exportation of Arms, Ammunition and
Implements of War to Italy and Ethiopia, 49 Stat. 3474 (Oct. 5, 1935), superseded by
Proclamation No. 2159 Prohibiting the Exportation of Arms, Ammunition, and
Implements of War to Italy and Ethiopia, 49 Stat. 3498 (Feb. 29, 1936), revoked by
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Statement Revoking Proclamation of Neutrality
in Ethiopian War (June 20, 1936), reprinted in ROOSEVELT, supra note 18, at 98.
' Press Conference, Executive Offices of the White House, June 19, 1936, at 10:40
am, reprinted in 3 FDR & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 332.
'0 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement Condemning Any Profiteering in War in Ethiopia
(Oct. 30, 1935), reprinted in ROOSEVELT, supra note 18, at 82. The Senate later
regretted not having included oil in the embargo so as to further disadvantage the
Italian military. 81 CONG. REC. 79 (1937) (statement of Sen. Gerald P. Nye).
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eliciting squeals from extreme isolationists. 1' The Roosevelt
administration knew that freeing up farmers and miners would allow
Mussolini to augment his army, the Italian economy being highly
agricultural as it was, particularly in the south. Nonetheless, business
ethics were not what Roosevelt had hoped, and American exports of
raw materials useful for war continued to grow. 2 While the net
effect of the application of the 1935 Neutrality Act abroad was to
disadvantage Italy, domestically the Act might have relieved moral
pressures to commit to stronger measures.
Perhaps because of the moral embargo's impotence, or
perhaps because most legislators agreed with the embargo as a policy
matter, Congress never actively opposed Roosevelt having announced
the moral embargo without congressional approval. Nobody
questioned when the President derived the right to attempt to obstruct
foreign commerce, a power that the Constitution explicitly delegates
to Congress. 3 Although the embargo was not a legal obstruction to
commerce, there is no question that Roosevelt meant to "regulate
foreign commerce." The respect that Roosevelt showed for
Congress' prerogatives in the Spanish Civil War already seemed on a
downward roll.
1o BURNS, supra note 7, at 258. For an example of squealing isolationists, see
BORCHARD & LAGE, supra note 1, at 320-21. For evidence of Borchard and Lage's
extreme isolationism and moral relativism, see id. at 361 (proclaiming that Japanese
aggression and atrocities in China "defy easy analysis" and it is "wise therefore to
reserve moral judgments. The complexity of the problem dictates neutrality."); id. at
392-93 (condemning Americans who "pronounce a moral judgment" on German
annexation of and atrocities in Austria and Czechoslovakia); id. at 394-95 (implying
that Roosevelt's appeal to Germany and Italy for nonaggression merited "ridicule" for
its misguided attempt to morally judge fascist aggression).
'o BURNS, supra note 7, at 258.
' U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 354 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1988) ("[The President] can prescribe no rules
concerning the commerce ... of the nation .... ).
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C. Japan Attempts to Swallow China
It was clear in the case of Abyssinia and Italy that the two
sides were at war; Roosevelt could not pretend otherwise and had no
reason for doing so. At the same time Roosevelt ignored Japan's
blatant acts of aggression against China for many years without ever
invoking any of the Neutrality Acts."' Although Japan did not declare
war on China"0 5 (nor did Chiang Kai-Shek declare war on Japan,
probably to avoid an American embargo)," it was clear by the July
1937 attack on and occupation of Peking (Beijing) that Japan was
systematically attempting to take over China and crush any opposition
to its imperialist rule. Roosevelt worried greatly about the safety of
China and was infuriated with Japan,"0 7 but refused to proclaim that
China and Japan were at war. Senator Pittman continually had to
invent excuses for Roosevelt's failure to find a state of war when, for
example, the Japanese escalated its bombing of Nanking in September
and October 1937 and Congress questioned why the Act had not yet
been invoked." 8 The real reason was fairly clear to the Japanese and
American public alike. Unlike his decision in the Spanish case, and
like his decision for Italy, Roosevelt's use of discretion aided the
104 Without declaring war, Japan had invaded Manchuria (a northern province of
China) in 193 1, in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. See FENWMCK, supra note 48,
at 159.
Jos BoRcHARD & LAGE, supra note 1, at 362.
" Cf 1 HuLL, supra note 7, at 641 (describing Chinese Foreign Office's worries that
1939 Neutrality Act would force Roosevelt to declare state of war between China and
Japan).
'0 See WELLES, supra note 3, at 68-69.
108 At first, Pittman attributed the President's failture to find a state of war to his
attempts to negotiate peace and the possibility that an embargo would hinder him in
that task. BORCHARD&LAGE, supra note I, at 362-63. He later claimed, confusingly,
that Roosevelt did not invoke the 1937 Act to protect Americans in the war zone. Id.
at 366.
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victim and impeded the aggressor." 9 By ignoring the obvious fact of
war between the countries, Roosevelt allowed American businesses to
profit by gasoline, steel, and other raw material sales to Japan, and to
aid China by arms and other sales; Japan depended mainly on the
United States for oil, and China depended almost entirely on the
United States for its arms."' Roosevelt did come close to applying
the Neutrality Act in September 1937, in order to prevent any
"incident" wherein the Japanese naval blocade might sink an American
ship carrying airplanes to China. Roosevelt issued a statement that
United States government merchent vessels could no longer transport
arms or implements of war to Japan or China that were prohibited by
his 1937 Neutrality Proclamation, and private merchant ships would
do so at their own risk. Roosevelt, however, declined to actually
invoke the Neutrality Act, declaring instead that the question of its
application would be decided "on a 24-hour basis." ' In fact, the
airplanes were actually shipped to China through England and its
Hong Kong colony.
In justifying the legality of his failure to find a state of war,
Roosevelt relied both on his statutory discretion, pointing out that
neither China nor Japan had declared war,112 and on his interpretation
of the ultimate intent of Congress. In December 1937, Secretary of
State Hull drafted a nine-page memorandum for Senator Pittman
detailing the rationale for Roosevelt's refusal to invoke the 1937
Neutrality Act against Japan and China.113  The main reasons
See W.W. Willoughby, FarEastern Policies of the United States, 34 AM. J. INT'L
L. 193,205 (1940).
11 See WELLES, supra note 3, at 69.
m Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement Regarding Shipment of Planes to China (Sept.
14, 1937), reprinted in ROOSEVELT, supra note 18, at 129.
112 See DRUMMOND, supra note 34., at 68-69.
"' Memorandum from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to Roosevelt (Dec. 11, 1937),
in 7 FDR & FOREIGN AFFAIRS 366 (Donald B. Schewe ed., 2d series 1979).
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advanced by Hull were similar to those that Roosevelt himself used;
the President had discretion to determine the applicability of the Act
and, given this discretion, the President acted reasonably because,
first, both countries had refrained from declaring war, and second, the
purposes of the Neutrality Act - keeping the United States out of
war and avoiding dangers to American citizens and commerce -
would not be fulfilled by invoking the Act." 4 In other words,
Roosevelt feared that invoking the Act would cause a deterioration in
U.S. relations with Japan. Hull further argued that fighting between
two countries does not necessarily mean they are at war, n 5 that a
determination of a state of war would hinder efforts of the signatories
of the Nine Power Pact to reach a peaceful settlement," 6 and in light
of all these circumstances, for the President to give "an unnecessarily
narrow and legalistic characterization to the fighting, regardless of the
real objective of the Neutrality Act, would . . . ignore his
constitutional responsibilities in the domain of the foreign relations of
our Government."'1 7 Henry Stimson, who in a few years would
become Roosevelt's Secretary of War, also felt that the Neutrality
Law usurped the President's constitutional power to recognize a state
of war between foreign governments, although he admitted that his
knowledge of the law on that subject was shaky." 8
There are strong reasons to question the validity of these
justifications. First, Congress had made it plain that, in passing the
1935 and 1937 Neutrality Acts, its purpose was to deny the President
,, 7 id. at 367-70.
, 7 id. at 37 1.
116 7 id. at 374-75.
,,7  id. at 374.
,1' See Letter from Henry L. Stimson to Raymond Leslie Buell, President, Foreign
Policy Association, Inc., at 1-3 (Nov. 13, 1937) (on file with Yale University Sterling
Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Henry L. Stimson Papers [hereinafter
Stimson Papers]).
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discretion in singling out aggressor states like Japan for unfavorable
treatment.119 Congress could not have been clearer had it mentioned
Japan in the statutes themselves. Moreover, the question of
belligerent nations having or not having declared war is not legally
dispositive of whether a state of war actually exists. 120 Hull himself
admitted that "Japan was factually at war with China, whatever the
legal situation."121 Stimson also conceded that "nearly every man on
the street would have a very vigorous view that what Japan is doing
in China today is war if there ever was war." ' Of course, if Japan
was factually at war with China, it was legally at war as well. If
Roosevelt refused to acknowledge the state of war, it did not mean
Japan was not at war under national or international law, it meant
Roosevelt was violating the intent of the 1935, 1936, and 1937
Neutrality Laws. This is particularly true in light of his words and
deeds in the Italian-Abyssinian war. In that conflict, Italy had not
declared war, but Roosevelt chose to invoke the Neutrality Act
because a U.S. embargo could only hurt Mussolini. In a June 1936
press conference: "Our own Neutrality Statute seems fairly clear that
when the President finds that a state of war exists he shall... issue a
proclamation. If you will remember last October - of course there
was no declaration of war - but almost as soon as there had been a
battle and people were killed, regular troops in action on both sides,
we found that a state of war existed."'" Roosevelt had found a state
of war to exist between Abyssinia and Italy despite the lack of any
declaration of war. "They are dropping bombs on Ethiopia - and
"9 See 1 HULL, supra note 7, at 229, 410-13, 461-63.
' See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
1 HULL, supra note 7, at 893.
2 Letter from Henry L. Stimson, supra note 118, at 2.
' See Press Conference, Executive Offices of the White House, June 19, 1936, at
10:40 am, FDR & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 332.
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that is war," he commented, "[w]hy wait for Mussolini to say so?" '124
Why, indeed? Declaring war is simply a formality compared to
attacking and occupying the territory of another state. While such a
thing as hostilities "short of war" exists,' that description would not
have fit the situation of one state attacking, bombing, and occupying
another for six years, then attempting to conquer it entirely. The same
reasoning must apply to the Sino-Japanese War as to the Italian-
Abyssian case. The plain meaning of the 1937 Neutrality Act required
the President to apply the Act if a state of war existed - declared or
undeclared - as it indisputably did between China and Japan.
Nowhere in the statute or records of debate did Congress manifest an
intent to give the President unfettered discretion in finding a state of
war to exist; quite the contrary, Congress repeatedly rejected
Roosevelt's proposed legislation giving him authority to determine
whether to apply an arms embargo.'26 In any case, where the
President is given discretion to act or not act by domestic legislation,
he must not neglect his constitutional duty to employ his discretion in
good faith.'27
The real reason that Roosevelt failed to follow his own
precedent and invoke the Neutrality Act in Japan's case was his desire
to continue trade with and aid to China.' While there was no danger
of provoking Italy, Roosevelt could not apply strong sanctions against
124 BURNs, supra note 7, at 257.
125 See generally CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 23 (2d ed. 1934).
But see Letter from Raymond Leslie Buell, President, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.,
to Henry L. Stimson, attachment at 2-3 (Nov. 10, 1937) (on file with Stimson Papers)
(arguing without that President has "widest discretion" to determine that there is no
state of war between Japan and China).
16 See I HULL, supra note 7, at 229, 410-13,461-63.
127 Cf. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ([The President] shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed .... ") (emphasis added).
12' See FENIWICK, supra note 48, at 145-46; WELLES, supra note 3, at 69.
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the Japanese from fear of undermining peace negotiations. 9
Moreover, although public opinion favored an embargo against
Japan, 13' Roosevelt believed that he was ultimately helping the
Chinese by not declaring a state of war to exist. In fact, rather than
imposing the "impartial" embargo mandated by the 1937 Neutrality
Act, Roosevelt attempted to dissuade American arms manufactureres
from trading with Japan.131 Clearly, Roosevelt had his cake and was
eating it, too. By not invoking the 1937 Neutrality Act, he benefitted
American businesses and Chiang Kai-Shek without seriously risking
American involvement in the war. Moreover, by not invoking the
Neutrality Act, Roosevelt could - and did - selectively impose
effective "moral embargoes" (but not legal embargoes) against certain
exports to Japanese in order to punish them for their actions in
China. 32 Professor W.W. Willoughby, writing in The American
Journal of International Law in 1940, found Roosevelt's failure to
find a state of war "perhaps" laudable because he approved of the aid
to China.133 He did not, however, discuss the questionable legality of
Roosevelt's policy except for noting Roosevelt's evident lack of
authority to institute an embargo, moral or otherwise.1
34
As for Stimson's admittedly unresearched assertion that the
Constitution confers upon the President alone the power to determine
when foreign states are at war, neither the Constitution nor historical
precedent offers any clear support. The Constitution does not
expressly or implicitly assign this function to the President; the only
129 See DALLEK, supra note 5, at 194.
130 Id. at 194-95, 236-37.
131 BORcHARD & LAGE, supra note 1, at 386-87.
132 See WILLOUGHBY, supra note 109, at 203. These embargoes, which increased
with time to eventually stop all trade with Japan, were one of the main causes of Japan
attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor.
133 See id. at 205.
134 See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 103.
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evident source of such a power would be the legally null dicta of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.135 Quincy Wright
attempted to justify that the President alone had the power to
recognize when foreign states are at war. His argument relied on an
assumption and a supposedly logical inference. The assumption is that
the President has vast powers in the field of foreign relations. To
support this contention he cited only the legally invalid dicta of
Curtiss-Wright, an article written by the author of that opinion
(Justice Sutherland), an article he had written,1 36 and, in a different
article addressing the same subject, the ancient Supreme Court case
The Divina Pastora,131 which he claimed held that the President has
authority to recognize the existence of a foreign war, but in reality
held no such thing. 13' From that highly dubious position he inferred
that "it may be doubted whether even a joint resolution, passed by
two-thirds in both houses over the President's veto, could recognize
the existence of foreign war and declare neutrality., 39 To support this
proposition, Wright cited two sources - a private statement by John
Quincy Adams when he was Secretary of State and a report from the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1897.140 Adams's view,
which he did not publicly espouse in the first place, can be disregarded
as self-serving and completely lacking in supporting evidence. As for
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Wright reports it to have
said: "In the department of international law, therefore, properly
'" 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See infra Section IV.D and Part V
136 See Quincy Wright, The Power to Declare Neutrality Under American Law, 34
AM. J. INT'LL. 302, 308-09 n.37 (1940).
3 The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat.] 52 (1819).
"~ Id. at 54; See Quincy Wright, The Lend-Lease Bill and International Law, 35
Am. J. Int'l L. 305, 305 n. 3 (1941).
139 See Wright, The Power to Declare Neutrality UnderAmerican Law, supra note
135, at 309.
14' Id. at 309 n.39.
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speaking a Congressional recognition of belligerency or independence
would be a nullity." While statements against interest should be given
heavy weight, isolated statements of a single committee of the Senate
during a single year are certainly not dispositive of the allocation of
power by the Constitution. Nonetheless, one could seek independent
justifications for such a grant of power to the President. After all, the
Senate was arguably correct in its assessment of recognition of
independence. The Constitution assigns to the President alone the
duty (not power, but duty) to receive foreign ambassadors.14 As for
the foreign belligerency issue, the Constitution confers no power or
duty on the President that could reasonably be applied directly or
analogously to recognition of belligerency. Recognizing foreign
belligerency does not apply any law already existing and cannot
therefore be characterized as "executive." On the contrary,
recognition of belligerency is a policy decision that entails either the
United States's participation in the war - clearly a congressional
prerogative - or a declaration of neutrality with all its attendent
alteration of existing laws - also a quintessentially legislative
function. Because the Constitution is not clear on the issue, and
considering the effects of the power to recognize foreign belligerency,
the most probable answer is that the President has power to recognize
foreign belligerency absent legislation to the contrary. Congress
alone may decide final issues of law and public policy, subject to the
President's veto. The recognition of foreign belligerency, while
certainly involving foreign affairs, more importantly affects issues of
public policy and law, and contrary to Wright's contention, the
decision of two-thirds of Congress decides the issue. In any case, the
legal issue is moot, first because the 1935, 1936, and 1937 Neutrality
"' U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 103, at 352
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that power to receive ambassadors "is more a matter
of dignity than authority").
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Acts had all been passed by more than two-thirds of Congress and
moreover signed by the President (signaling his recognition of
Congress' power to bind him and his consent to be bound by the law),
but also because nobody in the Roosevelt Administration ever publicly
contended that Congress hadnopower to force him to recognize two
or more states as being at war.
Finally, Hull argued that if the Neutrality Act were applied
strictly, such an application would not necessarily fulfill the intent of
the legislature even if it met the professed goal of neutrality. The
Roosevelt Administration argued that the Executive has a duty to
fulfill not the clear intent of the statute (to preserve American
neutrality), but the intent of Congress (to keep the United States out
of foreign wars). Because the 1936 and 1937 Neutrality Acts's grants
of discretion to the President were slightly ambiguous, Roosevelt
chose to pursue his interpretation of the intent of Congress (as
opposed to the intent of the statute) and to deny the obvious fact that
China and Japan were at war. Thus, Kissinger's quip that "[t]he
Neutrality acts had lasted only as long as there had been nothing to be
neutral about'" is incorrect. There was quite a bit to be neutral
about if Roosevelt had really wanted "a true neutrality," but Roosevelt
chose not to apply the Neutrality Acts. His evident partiality brings
into question whether Roosevelt was really following Congress' intent
or was simply using the Neutrality Acts as an excuse for advancing his
own agenda - namely, aiding victims of aggression. Yet, even if
Roosevelt had sincerely pursued what he regarded as Congress' intent
in enacting the statute, his duty was to apply the provisions
impartially, not to attempt to discern congressional intent by peering
' KiSSINGER, supra note 8, at 385.
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into a "mind" that, strictly speaking, Congress does not possess."" In
other words, Roosevelt had no legal right to ignore the provisions of
the 1937 Neutrality Act merely because he believed, or said he
believed, that it might provoke Japan somewhat. To provoke Japan
is Congress' prerogative.
D. The "Phony War" Period
Quite apart from the question of violating the neutrality laws
overtly, Roosevelt ardently sought ways to covertly evade the 1937
Neutrality Act, thus allowing him to aid the Allies. When Secretary
of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau questioned France's ability to pay
for American arms in October 1938, Roosevelt considered Jean
Monnet's suggestion that he expand aircraft production for France
and Britain by setting up a dummy corporation to assemble the planes
in Canadian factories, where neutrality laws would not apply.
Specifically, Roosevelt hoped to supply American components, which
would supposedly not qualify as "implements of war," instead of the
"4 As early as 1930, Max Radin argued that judges' duty was to interpret the wording
of the statute without attempting to guess what legislative intent might be. Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870 (1930). That view, which would
presumably apply to the Executive Branch as well, has been largely accepted by
scholars. See generally Jane S. Schachter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent":
Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. _ (forthcoming 1995)
(arguing that institutional structure of legislature shapes legislative outcomes so that
no single intent is discernible); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They, "Not an
"It" Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992) (arguing
that collective action problems render "legislative"or "popular" intent impossible);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1073, 1087 (1992) (claiming that no qualified scholars
accept possibility of discerning legislative intent).
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airplanes themselves.'" Moreover, Roosevelt could loan money to
the French through the Canadians because the Johnson Act would not
apply - Canada, unlike France, had not defaulted on its World War
I debts. Naturally, the hope of escaping detection was a distant one,
and Morgenthau opposed the idea.'45 Morgenthau, being a close
friend of the President, persuaded him to drop the idea for a while, but
one year later the press discovered that the United States was
wheeling bombers into Canada for use by the British.'46 Roosevelt
eventually used the Canadian route to sell Britain not just planes but
half a million rifles, and hundreds of machine guns and field artillery
guns.1
47
E. War in Europe
Soon after Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939
Roosevelt, for the first time, identified threats to small countries as
affecting American national security.' 4  Yet, he again refused to
invoke the neutrality laws. 149 "We'll be on the side of Hitler by
invoking the act," Roosevelt told a senator. "If we could get rid of the
arms embargo, it wouldn't be so bad."' 0 Roosevelt meant that the
arms embargo, by shutting Czechoslovakia off from American aid and
144 See KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 6; Lord Elibank, Franklin Roosevelt: Friend of
Britain, 187 CoNTEMw. REv. 364, 364-67 (1955); Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 146
Manuscript Diary 279-82 (Oct. 1939) (on file with FDR Lib.); DONALD CAMERON
WArr, How T E WAR CANE: THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR,
1938-1939, at 130 (1989).
14s See KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 6.
146 See BORCHARD & LAGE, supra note 1, at 411.
14 See I id. at 775.
14' Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 262 (1939).
"9 See DRUMMOND, supra note 34, at 183.
ISO See MILLER, supra note 17, at 434.
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arms sales, would benefit Germany, which produced its own weapons.
Roosevelt's statement demonstrates perfectly his understanding of
foreign relations and his disregard for legality. In his foreign relations
he was determined to aid the victims of fascist aggression, and he
viewed neutrality as an obstacle to that goal. Naturally, the United
States would not literally be "on the side of Hitler by invoking the
act," but the effect of American neutrality, Roosevelt knew, would be
to encourage the Nazis and prevent Czechoslovakia from resisting.
Roosevelt did not care about procedural neutrality, he cared about the
substantive effect of neutrality. Thus, he was not scrupulous about
obeying the letter or spirit of the law if it would hinder his foreign
policy goals.
When Germany invaded Poland in September, Roosevelt
finally had to invoke the 1937 Neutrality Act because Britain
immediately declared war. 5 ' Interestingly, Roosevelt recognized in
his proclamation of neutrality the applicability of the 1917 Espionage
Act to the war.' Yet, when the Soviet Union invaded Poland that
same month, Roosevelt refused to invoke the neutrality laws again
from fear of antagonizing Moscow.'53 He also did not publicly
recognize the applicability of the 1917 Espionage Act to the
Soviet-Polish War despite the lack of any substantial difference
between that war and the German-Polish War. Once again, Roosevelt
5 ' Proclamation No. 2348 Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War
Between Germany and France; Poland; and the United Kingdom, India, Australia and
New Zealand, 54 Stat. 2629 (Sept. 5, 1939), superseded by Proclamation No. 2374
Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War Between Germany and
France; Poland; and the United Kingdom, India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
South Africa, 54 Stat. 2671 (Nov. 4, 1939). Following this proclamation, Roosevelt
listed the forbidden exports to the belligerents. Proclamation No. 2349 on Export of
Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War to France; Germany; Poland; and the
United Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand, 54 Stat. 2635 (Sept. 5, 1939).
52 Proclamation No. 2348, supra note 151, at 2630.
153 DRUMMOND, supra note 34, at 208.
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used the legislative intent to stay out of war as a means to ignore the
wording of the Neutrality Act. Yet, he had issued proclamations of
neutrality for Canada' and South Africa. 155 Roosevelt's
inconsistency in applying his discretion under the Neutrality Act
would soon turn to consistency - that is, consistent refusal to invoke
the Act.
When the Soviet Union attacked Finland, Rumania, and the
Baltic states, and was in turn attacked by Germany on June 22, 1941,
Roosevelt again ignored the neutrality law in order to provide aid to
the Finns and later, the Soviets. 56 As in the case of Japan and China,
it seemed absurd for Roosevelt to pretend that the Soviets and the
Finns were not at war. On November 28, 1939 Soviet Commissar of
Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov denounced the Finnish-Russian
Nonaggression Pact, and two days later Stalin ordered the bombing
of Helsinki (Helsingfors) and attempted to invade at eight points along
the Russia-Finland border." 7  Roosevelt shared the American
friendliness toward the Finns, admired their fierce and skillful soldiers,
and appreciated their conscientious payments on United States loans
from World War I. Roosevelt could not sit idly through Russia's
" Proclamation No. 2359 Proclaming the Neutrality of the United States in the War
Between Germany, on the One Hand, and Canada, on the Other Hand, 54 Stat. 2652
(Sept 10, 1939); Proclamation No. 2360, Concerning Export of Arms, Ammunition,
and Implements of War to Canada, 54 Stat. 2653 (Sept. 10, 1939).
' Proclamation No. 2353 Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War
Between Germany, on the One Hand, and the Union of South Africa, on the Other
Hand, 54 Stat. 2643 (Sept. 8, 1939); Proclamation No. 2354 Concerning the Export
of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War to the Union of South Africa, 54 Stat.
2644 (Sept. 8, 1939).
156 See Memorandum of Conversation by Sumner Welles, Acting U.S. Secretary of
State (June 26, 1941), reptinted in I FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 769, 770
(1958); DRUMMOND, supra 34, at 209-10, 278-79; FENWICK, supra note 48, at 146.
1s7 1 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 539.
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"dreadful rape of Finland."'58 Instead of invoking the Neutrality Act,
Roosevelt announced another moral (and legal high-octane aircraft
fuel) embargo on the Soviet Union and sold much-needed planes to
Finland.'59 The Finns had also requested a $60 million loan, but
Roosevelt responded with a $10 million agricultural credit. 6 ' He
declined to give more: "I may be a benevolent dictator and all
powerful Santa Claus and though the spirit moves me at times, I still
operate under the laws which an all-wise Congress passes."'6' In this
particular case, Roosevelt was indeed operating under the 1939
Neutrality Act. American neutrality in the Soviet-Finnish War had no
appreciable affect on American security, and Roosevelt therefore had
no need to invoke the Act. But he was not operating under the
Constitution, as he had no more authority to institute a moral embargo
on the Soviet Union than on Japan or Italy.
Also in November1939, Roosevelt decided to take decisive
action to prevent the strangulation of British trade by the massive Nazi
sinkings of British merchant vessels. Because Britain could afford to
buy few American merchant vessels and the supply of its own was so
rapidly diminishing, Roosevelt proposed registering American ships in
Panama so they could carry supplies directly to Britain. 62 This would
eschew the "carry" prohibition of the 1939 Neutrality Act's "cash-
and-carry" provision. Although Hull's opposition to this proposal
convinced Roosevelt not to undertake this evasion of the law, the
incident demonstrates a willingness to skirt the law that Roosevelt
would unabashedly display many times in the coming two years.
158 BuRNs, supra note 7, at 415; MILLER, supra note 17, at 442.
"5 See Borchard & Lage, supra note 1, at 416-19.
'6 MILLER, supra note 17, at 442.
161 Id.
162 See I HULL, supra note 7, at 698.
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IV. ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1940-1941
As explained in Subsection II.C.4, the 1939 Neutrality Act,
while still requiring the President to identify belligerents, at least gave
him latitude to aid the antifascist states. The provisions of the 1939
Neutrality Act (enacted on November 9) loosened the commercial
restrictions considerably. Yet, the substantive restrictions were not
loose enough for Roosevelt. He would bend and break them several
times before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor twenty-three months later.
A. The Axis Attacks the Neutrals
When Germany attacked Denmark and Norway in April 1940
Roosevelt quickly proclaimed American neutrality and forbade the use
of American ports and territorial waters in accordance with the 1939
Neutrality Act and with international law.163 When Nazi forces
swarmed into neutral Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in
May,' and when Italy joined the war in June, Roosevelt issued more
proclamations. 65 The proclamations brought the 1939 Neutrality Act
'" Proclamation No. 2399 Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War
Between Cermany, on the One Hand, And Norway, on the Other Hand, 54 Stat. 2699
(Apr. 25, 1940); Proclamation No. 2400 on the Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of
the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, 54 Stat. 2699 (Apr. 25,
1940).
"' Proclamation No. 2405 Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War
Between Germany, on the One Hand, and Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands,
on the Other Hand, 54 Stat. 2704 (May 11, 1940); Proclamation No. 2406 on the Use
of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign
Belligerents, 54 Stat. 2705 (May 11, 1940).
" Proclamation No. 2408 Proclaiming the Neutrality of the United States in the War
Between Italy, on the One Hand, and France and the United Kingdom, on the Other
Hand, 54 Stat. 2707 (June 10, 1940); Proclamation No. 2409 on the Use of Ports or
Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States,
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into full effect, and constrained Roosevelt's ability to aid the Allies
and neutrals without further legislation.
At the same time, Roosevelt sought ways to give financial and
other aid to the nonfascist powers. Roosevelt instructed Secretary
Morgenthau not to be excessively strict about making loans to the
Allies so long as the money was not used to buy arms. Because the
Johnson Act forbade loans to Britain or France, he directed
Morgenthau to find a legal basis for making loans to countries in
default of their war loans to the United States. The General Counsel
of the Treasury Department told Morgenthau, "I believe that there is
legal authority" to set up a fund under the Gold Reserve Act to
stabilize the exchange value of the dollar and make loans to foreign
countries through that fund.' The General Counsel advised
consulting the appropriate committees of Congress on the policy
issues involved. Of course, due to the inevitable biased
implementation of the stabilizing loans - Roosevelt certainly did not
intend to stabilize the dollar against the reichsmark or the lira even
though U.S. investment in Germany had grown by 36 percent from
1936-194016 - such a use of the Gold Reserve Act might have
violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Neutrality Act. By its letter,
Section 7 of the 1939 Neutrality Act forbade "any person" within the
United States to make loans to a belligerent state.168  Whether
54 Stat. 2707 (June 10, 1940); Proclamation No. 2444 Proclaiming the Neutrality of
the United States in the War Between Italy on the One Hand, And Greece, on the
Other Hand, 54 Stat. 2764 (Nov. 15, 1940); Proclamation No. 2445 on the Use of
Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent
States, 54 Stat. 2764 (Nov. 15, 1940).
See Letter from Edward H. Foley, Jr., Acting General Counsel to the Dept. of the
Treasury, to Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury (May 2, 1940) (on file with
FDR Lib.).
167 WATr, supra note 143, at 258.
"c h. 2, § 7, 54 STAT. 4,8 (1939).
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Secretary Morgenthau or the Treasury Department qualified as a
"person" are open to debate, but in spirit the law was clearly intended
to prevent loans to belligerents that were not authorized by Congress.
As early as March or April 1940 Roosevelt considered evading
the 1939 Neutrality Act and the Johnson Act through loans or gifts.169
He soon changed his mind resolving instead to evade the 1939
Neutrality Act's prohibition on government arms sales by selling
"surplus arms" to the Allies. Morgenthau told Roosevelt that,
although the government could not sell weapons to belligerents under
the Neutrality Act, "[i]t's a question of can we do it illegally."'70
Roosevelt then asked his advisor Harry Hopkins "how far" he could
go in ignoring the 1939 Neutrality Act despite his having signed it. 7'
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and Vice President Garner both
encouraged him to believe that the President's plenary powers over
foreign affairs rendered the neutrality laws inoperative. 72 Roosevelt
took their advice to heart, and on June 3, 1940, he approved over the
objections of Secretary of War Harry Woodring the sale of almost $38
million "surplus" government rifles, artillery, antiaircraft guns, and
ammunition from World War I to the United States Steel Corporation,
which promptly resold them to the Anglo-French Purchasing
Commission without profit. 73 The legal basis upon which Roosevelt
rested his authority to sell "surplus" United States military property
was a 1919 statute that Attorney General Robert Jackson had
269 See generally KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 36-37.
270 SHOGAN, supra note 17, at 82.
171 DALLEK, supra note 5, at 190.
172 Id.
7 See 2 BLuM, supra note 164, at 149-54; 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 126;
DALLEK, supra note 5, at 227; 1 HuLL, supra note 7, at 770; KIMBALL, supra note 11,
at 44-45.
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discovered appearing to authorize such sales. 74 Although the
weapons were not "surplus" by any definition of the word, and
although the drafters of the statute obviously never contemplated the
sale of arms to private individuals or companies for the purpose of
resale to belligerents in violation of a different, later statute, Roosevelt
plowed ahead with similar sales. On June 6, for example, the Navy
Department disclosed a sale of fifty Hell Diver bombers to Britain that
were "temporarily in excess of requirements.""' Two days later,
Roosevelt held a press conference. He read aloud Solicitor General
Francis Biddle's opinion that the airplanes were surplus and available
for sale based on the 1919 appropriations act, but he never mentioned
that these bombers the Navy described as "aging" carried two machine
guns, 1,000 pounds of bombs, and had in some cases been in service
only for three months. 76 Nonetheless, when one reporter asked
whether Roosevelt was authorized to sell new armaments, Roosevelt
responded by joking, "[n]o, not if it is brand new armament, unless it
is out of date - and, as you know, a plane can get out of date darned
fast.""' Of course, after the massive American post-World War
disarmament and the rearmament of the hostile fascist states,
everything that could shoot was necessary to national defense; indeed,
by the large scale sales the United States had reduced its equipment
'7' PHILIP GOODHART, FIFr SHIPS THAT SAVED THE WORLD 60 (1965). The statute,
an Army appropriations act, authorized the Secretary of War to sell "any surplus
supplies including motor trucks and automobiles now owned by and in the possession
of the Government... to any corporation or individual upon such terms as may be
deemed best." 41 Stat. 104, 105 (1919).
175 See Help in Washington, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1940, at 1, 1, 14.
"76 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference on June 8, 1940, reprinted in 15
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 541, 543-48 (1972) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL PRESS
CONFERENCES].
'77 Id. at 548.
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to the bare minimum required by the Army mobilization plan, 17' and
the Army had even been denied its request for one to three squadrons
of the Hell Divers not long before the Navy's announcement. 179
Nonetheless, Roosevelt cajoled the Army Chief of Staff, General
George C. Marshall, into designating about $38 million in rifles,
artillery, and ammunition as "surplus."' 8 °  The Roosevelt
Administration could get away with this subterfuge because Congress
was so ignorant of the administration's activities that not only would
legislators not have known if administration officials lied about their
arms sales, but Congress did not even have the factual background to
know the right questions to ask."' Absent Congress' objections,
Roosevelt went ahead with a deal that clearly violated the 1939
Neutrality Act, partly because Roosevelt's advisers led him to believe
the law was on his side. If the law was on his side, one wonders why
Roosevelt felt the need to lie and hide his actions from Congress. In
a blatant example of the Administration's deception, for instance,
when questioned on July 25 by reporters about Britain's ability to pay
for the massive number airplanes being produced for them,
Morgenthau answered "they have plenty of money - plenty."
1 82
Morgenthau was well aware that Britain had nothing near the
estimated $7 billion needed to pay for airplanes." 3 With typical
understatement, Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long
admitted in his diary that Roosevelt's new aid policy was "perhaps not
178 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 126.
179 SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 83.
ISO See KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 44-45.
181 Interview with Myres S. McDougal, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Yale
Law School, and former attorney for the State Department and the Lend-Lease
Administration, in North Branford, C.T. (Mar. 9, 1995).
18 KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 67.
'8' See id.
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entirely open and honestly expressed."' 84
These deceptions brought loud objections from several of
Roosevelt's cabinet members, most prominently the isolationist
Secretary of War Woodring. While the Chief of Naval Operations,
General George Marshall, would hem and haw before consenting to
participate in Roosevelt's illegalities, he almost always ended up
obeying the Commander in Chief Secretary Woodring was typically
more recalcitrant, however, and on June 19, 1940, Roosevelt
requested his resignation.18 Having finally divested himself of
opposition to his plans, Roosevelt was free to appoint a more
compliant Secretary of War. In a masterful political move, he chose
Henry Stimson, a respected Republican internationalist; Stimson's
appointment simultaneously moved the cabinet toward intervention in
Europe while preempting any really effective Republican criticism of
his choice.
B. Aid to China
By July 1940, in the face of continued Japanese aggression in
China and Indochina, flagrant disregard for the safety of American
residents and their property, and bombing of civilians,186 Roosevelt
decided to stop the export to Japan of aviation gasoline, an act that
Japan strenuously protested without changing its policy. Unsatisfied
with that response, Roosevelt restricted the export of iron and steel
scrap on September 30 and of all iron and steel in December. Each
"" BPECKNzrDGE LONG, THE WRDtARY OF BRECKINRIDGE LONG, 1939-1944, at 86
(Fred Israel ed., 1966) [hereinafter LONG].
181 RoosEvELT, FHs LiFE AND Tii~s 461 (Otis L. Graham, Jr. & Meghan Robinson
Wander eds., 1985); GOODHART, supra note 175, at 101.
" 1 HULL, supra note 7, at 632,633.
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time Japan protested the discriminatory restrictions."8 7 After all, if
Japan was perpetuating an unjust war against China as the Roosevelt
Administration accused, why did Roosevelt not issue the proclamation
required by the 1939 Neutrality Act? In an even more clearly biased
move in November, he arranged a $100 million loan and a transfer of
one hundred planes to Chiang Kai-Shek."' The President had no
statutory or constitutional authorization to institute these embargoes
or to give away American planes or funds to China. On the other
hand, the 1939 Neutrality Act gave him discretion not to label the two
states "at war."
C. The Failed PT-Boat Sale and the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal
Meanwhile, Roosevelt was exploring how he might get aid to
Britain in response to a May request from the new British Prime
Minister, Winston Churchill. German U-boats were sinking British
merchant ships more than twice as fast as the British could replace
them.8 9 Churchill's pleas for aid had reached a desperate and
dramatic pitch: "Mr. President, with great respect I must tell you that
in the long history of the world, this is a thing to do now." At first,
Roosevelt had demurred, pointing out that congressional authorization
was required before he could dispose of United States property like
ships. 9' Yet, Roosevelt was sympathetic and eventually tried to send
twenty-three new PT-boats (eleven torpedo boats and twelve
submarine chasers) without congressional approval. When the Navy's
" These protests may be found in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 219-25,
237 (1957).
,s See DALLEK, supra note 5, at 270.
,s 2 HuLL, supra note 7, at 935.
190 Telegram from Winston Churchill [alias "Former Naval Person"] to Roosevelt
(July 31, 1940), reprinted in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 57, 58 (1957).
'19 See 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 23.
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Judge Advocate General (J.A.G.) declared that such a sale would be
illegal, Roosevelt branded him "a sea lawyer" and "an old admiral
whose mental capacity I know personally."'" He advised Navy
Secretary Charles Edison to send the J.A.G. on vacation and find a
more compliant replacement. In response to Edison's repeated
objections, Roosevelt told him to forget legality and follow orders. 3
However, Congress got wind of the deal, and Senator David Walsh -
Chairman of the Naval Committee - flew into a rage. No
Massachusetts congressman could afford to support aid to Britain
from fear of alienating his Irish constituency. When Walsh inquired
into the legal basis of the PT-boat sale, Lewis Compton, Acting
Secretary of the Navy, weakly responded that the Navy could modify
its contracts under general legislation passed by Congress. Walsh's
response in the Senate dripped with sarcasm:
Now, Senators, see how careful we shall have to be in
our legislation. They have a right to modify or change
their contracts. So, all these transactions have been
based, not on any legal authority - for they have none
- to dispose of any property except surplus, but upon
the fact that they have authority to modify or change
contracts. Who in God's name, in Congress or in the
country, thought, when such a power was given, that
these contracts for our own protection would be
modified or changed in order to assist one side or the
other, or all sides, of belligerents at war?'94
The only reason Roosevelt never consummated the sale was that he
" GOODHART, supra note 175, at 88.
193 Id. at 88.
191 86 CONG. REC. 13319 (1940) (statement of Sen. David Walsh).
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failed to hide the transaction from Congress; when Walsh threatened
to cause trouble, Roosevelt had to back down and call off the deal.195
Three days later, Congress passed the Act of June 28, 1940 with the
Walsh Amendment. Significantly, Roosevelt's excuse for canceling
the deal was an informal opinion by Attorney General Robert Jackson
stating that the sale of ships to Britain would violate the 1917
Espionage Act - an opinion, incidentally, with which the President
"concurred."' 9 6  Predictably, the isolationists in Congress were
thrilled. One prominent senator commented, "I am glad Bob Jackson
looked up the law on the subject.
19 7
This was a setback to Roosevelt's plans, but not a defeat. In
an August 13 meeting with War Secretary Stimson, .Navy Secretary
Knox, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, and Undersecretary of State
Sumner Welles, the President decided to exchange ships for leases on
bases in Britain's colonies without congressional approval.198
Roosevelt told Churchill that he hoped to send at least fifty "over-age"
destroyers, twenty torpedo boats, and several planes immediately in
exchange for assurances for sales or leases on bases in seven British
colonies.'99 In fact, this was quite an appealing deal for the United
States, since the dollar value of the leases far exceeded that of the
arms, even if the British needed the destroyers far more than the U.S.
needed the bases. From the British viewpoint, Winston Churchill
195 BURNS, supra note 7, at 421-22.
"' See Torpedo Boat Sale to British Halted, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1940, at 10;
Statement on Torpedo Boat Sale Ban, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1940, at 10.
197 Torpedo BoatSale to British Halted, supra note 197, at 10.
198 See Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary (Aug. 13, 1940) (on file with Stimson
Papers).
"9 Letter from Ben Cohen, General Counsel to the National Power Policy Committee,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Missy LeHand, personal secretary to the President (Aug.
12, 1940) (on file with FDR Lib.); Telegram from Roosevelt to Winston Churchill
[alias "Former Naval Person"] (Aug. 13, 1940), reprinted in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 20, at 65, 65-66 (1957).
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preferred to have the bases in American hands so that, if the bases
were attacked, the British would not have to defend them.2
Roosevelt tried to hide the details of his negotiations without much
success. After announcing discussions with Britain regarding the
acquisition of bases, he stated that he did not know what the United
States would give Britain in return.' Reporters grilled him about the
possibility of exchanging the bases for destroyers, but Roosevelt
repeatedly emphasized that destroyers were not involved in the
discussions and had nothing to do with the bases.2 2
On September 2 Roosevelt, with enormous apprehension,
announced the deal publicly and published an exchange of notes that
can only be described as deliberately deceptive. In the notes, the
British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, proposed to
lease "freely and without consideration," certain naval and air bases to
the United States, while leasing others in exchange for naval and
military equipment.0 3 Hull's public response made it sound as if the
subsequent offer of fifty destroyers originated spontaneously from the
United States.' 4 Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations,
200 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 357-58.
2! Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference on Aug. 16, 1940, reprinted in 16
PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES, supra note 177, at 123, 125.
202 Id. at 123-26.
2 The British Ambassador (Lothian) to the Secretary of State (Hull), 54 Stat. 2405,
2405 (1940). The draft note had gone even further, claiming that the lease of the
bases was an outright "grant." Draft Note from His Majesty's Ambassador to Mr.
Cordell Hull 2 (no date) (on file with FDR Lib.).
' The Secretary of State (Hull) to the British Ambassador (Lothian), 54 Stat. 2406,
2408 (1940). The draft of this note was even more deceptive. It repeated and
emphasized that Britain did not desire compensation, but insisted upon "mak[ing]
some contribution towards the security of the United Kingdom" in return, and then
stated "[t]he United States Government wish to make it clear that they do not desire
any payment in return for this naval and military material." Draft Note from Mr.
Cordell Hull to His Majesty's Ambassador 2 (no date) (on file with FDR Lib.).
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then sent a memo/press release to the White House declaring that "an
exchange of fifty over-age destroyers for suitable naval and air bases
on ninety-nine year leases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas
[etc.]... will strengthen rather than impair total defense in the United
States.'205 Stark's memo released Roosevelt to sell the ships under
the Walsh Amendment, 2' but did nothing about the provisions of the
1917 Espionage Act.
Roosevelt's apprehension about the reaction of the public
proved unjustified. The public was not unfavorable to the
announcement, although isolationists in Congress seethed with spleen.
On the other hand, even some of those favorable to the proposal were
outraged by Roosevelt's failure to consult Congress. Wendell Willkie,
for example, approved the trade in general but reacted to Roosevelt's
decision to bypass Congress by calling it "the most dictatorial and
arbitrary act of any President in the history of the United States.
20 7
Of course, Willkie was competing for Roosevelt's job and
undoubtedly knew he was exaggerating, but his point was well taken
- Roosevelt appeared to be overreaching quite willfully.
There are other reasons to criticize the deal as well. Stark's
assessment of the effect of the destroyers-for-bases deal on the
defense of the United States, for example, at least seems questionable.
Less than four months earlier, Roosevelt - an expert on naval affairs
himself - had stated that: "to me it seems doubtful, from the
standpoint of our own defense requirements, which must inevitably be
linked with defense requirements of this hemisphere and with our
obligations in the Pacific, whether we could dispose even temporarily
205 Western Union Press Message from R.H. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to
Stephen Early, Secretary to the President (no date) (on file with FDR Lib.).
206 Act of June 28, 1940 § 14(a), 54 Stat. 676, 681.
207 BURNS, supra 7, at 441.
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of these destroyers. 2 °8  Similarly, in June 1940 Roosevelt
telegrammed Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles: "Our old
destroyers cannot be sold as obsolete as is proved by fact. All of them
are now in commission and in use or are in process of being
commissioned for actual use.""°  Yet, even assuming that the
destroyers were surplus, there was still the issue of illegality under
laws other than the Walsh Amendment, which did not authorize the
President to sell, trade, or transfer arms or vessels if the sale, trade, or
transfer conflicted with Title V of the 1917 Espionage Act, as Hull
recognized at the time.2"' Even assuming that the destroyers-for-bases
deal strengthened the overall long-term defense of the United States
in accordance with the terms of the 1940 Act, it was a "decidedly
unneutral" deal in Winston Churchill's words" because, although the
dollar value of the possessions was higher, Britain needed the
destroyers much more than the U.S. needed Britain's possessions.
212
Churchill himself later opined that the Germans would have been
justified in declaring war based upon commonly acknowledged
historical standards. 213 Whether or not this assessment of international
law is correct (Churchill did not know how much the U.S. Navy
Department wanted those bases and was not accounting for their
long-term value214), the destroyers-for-bases deal certainly raised
' Telegram from Roosevelt to Winston Churchill [alias "the former naval person"]
(May 16, 1940), reprinted in 3 Foreign relations, supra note 20, at 49, 50.
20 Telegram from Roosevelt to Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State (June 1,
1940), reprinted in CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL, BACK DOOR TO WAR 591 (1952).
210 See I HULL, supra note 7, at 833.
211 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 358.
212 KISSINGER, supra note 8, at 388.
213 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 358.
214 Cf. 1 HULL, supra note 7, at 832 ("The Navy had long wanted additional bases
along the Atlantic."); I SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL
OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR I 36 (1988) (citing Chief of Navy Operations Harold R.
Stark as saying that destroyers were expendable, bases were not).
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issues of illegality under national neutrality laws and constitutional
principles.
D. Legal and Constitutional Bases for Destroyers-for-Bases
The President's Legal Adviser, Green Hackworth, had advised
Roosevelt that the destroyers-for-bases deal would be illegal under
title 18, section 23 of 1917 Espionage Act as well as section 14(a) of
the Act of June 28, 1940 (the Walsh Amendment). 215 He advised the
President to seek an amendment of the Act of June 28, 1940.216
Assistant Attorney General Newman (Judge) Townsend agreed with
this assessment.21 7 A more complete legal opinion came from Ben V.
Cohen, then the General Counsel to the National Power Policy
Committee, an agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior, who
sent a memorandum to Roosevelt stating his opinion that "there is no
legal barrier, by reason of our own statutes or the law of nations,
which would stand in the way of the release of our old destroyers
from our naval service and their sale to the British. 218
Cohen directly addressed whether the proposed actions
violated the 1917 Espionage Act. He argued that because Congress
enacted the Espionage Act to provide "for the observance of
obligations imperatively imposed by international law on the United
States" and "for the fulfilment of the duty owed by the United States
21 Memorandum from Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser to the President, to
Roosevelt (Aug. 2, 1940), reprinted in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 59,
59-60 (1957).
216 Id. at 60.
227 Memorandum from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to Roosevelt (Aug. 4, 1940),
reprinted in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 61.
2' Memorandum from Ben V. Cohen, General Counsel to the National Power Policy
Committee, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Roosevelt (July 19, 1940) (on file with FDR
Lib.).
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to other nations with which it is at peace," the Act did not apply to the
destroyers-for-bases deal.2"9 His reasoning was that "it is only
reasonable to suppose that the intent of Congress was to fulfil its
obligations under ... Article 8 of the [1907] Hague Convention
[XIII].. . 'to prevent the fitting out or arming within its jurisdiction
of any vessel... "" By construing the Espionage Act in the light of
selected legislative history, Cohen arrived at the conclusion that the
plain wording of the statute was not as it appeared, but was instead
",unclear."221
This reading of the statute both appears contrived and ignores
"the duty owed by the United States to other nations with which it is
at peace," as stated in the Act. Under international law, that duty is
that the neutrality of the United States, in Roosevelt's words, must be
a true neutrality. Unequal assistance active or passive (beyond pure
"acts of humanity") to either state is clearly prohibited.222 In
particular, the United States could not become a base for the
operations of any belligerent. Although the text of the 1917
Espionage Act makes no reference whatever to the 1907 Hague
Convention, it is clear from Attorney General T.W. Gregory's
statements at the time that Congress' intent was, as Cohen argued, to
provide legislation to enforce the United States's international legal
obligations arising under the 1907 Hague Convention. Attorney
General Gregory cited Rule 1 of the 1871 Treaty of Washington and
article 8 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII to show that neither
treaty imposed an obligation on neutral governments to prevent the
building of warships for belligerents, although both treatiesforbid the
219 Id. at 7-8 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 30, 65th Cong. 1st Sess., at 9).
220 Id. at 8.
221 Id. at 7-10.
222 20PPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 48, at 520-21, 523, 542.
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delivery of any war vessel to a belligerent. 22 However, no domestic
legislation forbade such deliveries. In discussing title V, section 3 of
the Espionage Act, Congress explicitly approved the Attorney
General's recommendation to pass legislation enforcing the
obligations of the United States under international law.224 Thus, it
appears almost certain that Congress did indeed intend to outlaw the
delivery of any war vessel to belligerents, whether or not it was built
to the order of a belligerent.
In any case, Cohen failed to mention other international laws
that Congress had probably considered in passing the Espionage Act.
These laws include the 1907 Hague Convention XIII, article 6, which
provides that "[tihe supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a
neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or
war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden. 225 Moreover, the
destroyers-for-bases deal was illegal under customary laws. Cohen
made an arguably passable showing that under customary international
law private individuals (including private companies) could sell ships
that were not made to order to belligerents. 226 The destroyers in
question, in this case, already existed and could therefore perhaps be
sold by private individuals if they owned them. However, the United
States government is not a private individual, and under international
law may not sell vessels like its subjects may. Cohen himself admitted
that for the sale to be legal Roosevelt would have to sell the ships to
211 HERBERT W. BRIGS, NeglectedAspects of the Destroyer Deal, 34 Am. J. Int'l L.
569,576-77 (1940).
224 H.R. REP. No. 30, 65th Cong., I st Sess. (1917).
225 36 Stat. 2415, 2428 art. 6 (1907).
226 COHEN cited 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 574-76 to
support his position. But see Edwin Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on
the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 690, 695 (1940)
(arguing that Oppenheim is wrong; not even private individuals may sell existing
vessels to belligerents under international law).
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a private individual. Indeed the State Department had come to the
same conclusion; it refrained from objecting to the illegal deal on
political grounds.' Thus, even the President's most ardent advocates
admitted that the deal violated customary international law and the
1917 Espionage Act.
The President has a duty to interpret the statute in such a way
as not to conflict with international law, if at all possible.228 By not
doing so, Roosevelt violated his own executive duties and infringed
Congress' right to interpret legislatively United States obligations
under international law.2 9 Roosevelt knew that Cohen's legal
reasoning was too weak to withstand the close scrutiny Congress
would give it. As he commented to the Secretary of the Navy, "I
frankly doubt if Cohen's memorandum would stand up .... Also I
fear Congress is in no mood at the present time to allow any form of
sale.""
Roosevelt had other means of combatting legal objections that
could allow him to avoid congressional disapproval; he did not act on
the advice of Cohen alone. Rather, Attorney General Robert
See I HULL, supra note 7, at 707; LONG, supra note 185, at 125.
See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804);
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822); 4 Alexander Hamilton, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton 440, 444 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904); Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1975); 6 JAMES MADISON, THE
WRTNGS OF JAMES MADISON 159 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); cf United States v.
Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 199 1) (judiciary must interpret statutes in
such a way as to comply with international law whenever possible).
' See Edward S. Corwin, Executive Authority Held Exceeded in Destroyer Deal,
N.Y. Times (WEEK IN REvIEW), Oct. 13, 1940, at 6E, 7E.
' Memorandum from Roosevelt to Frank Knox, U.S. Secretary of the Navy (July 22,
1940), quoted in GOODHART, supra note 175, at 152.
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Jackson' and former Treasury Under Secretary Dean Acheson 2 also
gave legal advice. According to Acheson, the President had the
power to dispose of naval vessels in any way that caused a net
improvement in national security. Yet, Acheson did not dwell on the
constitutional issues raised by this contention, as he felt that Roosevelt
had sufficient statutory authority to consummate the destroyers-for-
bases deal. In his defense of the deal, Acheson relied heavily on the
Walsh Amendment discussed in Section I.D. Acheson argued that
Congress must have intended the Walsh Amendment to apply to Army
as well as Navy equipment, and that the statute therefore constituted
an independent source of authority for the President to dispose of
weapons so long as he first obtained the approval of the Army Chief
of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations."3 Acheson also tackled the
1917 Espionage Act, repeating Cohen's dubious interpretation of
statutory intent and his misinterpretation of international law as well.
Finally, Acheson pointed out that the 1939 Neutrality Act was no bar
to the destroyers-for-bases deal as long as Roosevelt first sold the
ships to a private company (which Roosevelt did not subsequently
do). Interestingly, despite the Acheson editorial's fairly evident
weaknesses, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter called Secretary
of War Henry Stimson to express reserved agreement with the
article's conclusions,"4 even though he had suggested that Cohen
contact Dean Acheson to gather support from other lawyers in the
'' Letter from Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney General, to Roosevelt (Aug. 27, 1940),
reprintedin 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1941); 10 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES, supra
note 91, at 394, 3 94-405.
' Charles C. Burlingham et al., No Legal Bar Seen to Transfer of Destroyers, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 1940, at E8.
23 See id.
234 See Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary at 2-3 (Aug. 15, 1940), (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Stimson Papers).
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first place3 5 Roosevelt, on the other hand, professed in a press
conference never even to have read the legal opinion3 6
Jackson, unlike Cohen and Acheson, relied mainly on a
constitutional basis for Roosevelt's action independent of statutory
justifications. While attempting to hurdle the legislative obstacles to
the deal in precisely the same terms as Cohen and Acheson, Jackson
nonetheless concentrated on the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces and as the principal agent of the United
States in foreign affairs. Jackson first attempted to find congressional
approval for the deal in an 1883 act that did indeed authorize the
President to sell Navy vessels3 7  Jackson knew that the 1917
Espionage Act superseded that ancient statute238 In order to get
around his previous opposition to the nearly indistinguishable PT-boat
deal based on the Espionage Act," 9 Jackson essentially repeated
Cohen's misinterpretation of the Espionage Act and argued that
because the destroyers already existed (unlike the PT-boats, which
were made to order) the Act did not apply. 4 Jackson also repeated
Acheson's argument that the Walsh Amendment authorized the
President to dispose of Navy property at will.24'
Knowing the weakness of his statutory arguments, Jackson
had one antidote for all statutory obstacles. He drew support from a
23S See GOODHART, supra note 175, at 160.
236 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference on Aug. 16, 1940, reprinted in 16
PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES, supra note 177, at 123, 127.
237 Letter from Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney General, to Roosevelt (Aug. 27, 1940),
PuBLicPAPERs & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 489. The statute in question was The
Act of March 3, 1883, § 5, ch. 141, 22 Stat. 582, 599-600 (1883).
MS See also Borehard, supra note 227, at 690, 692 (arguing that 1883 statute did not
authorize exchange for other reasons).
" See supra text accompanying note 197.
2' Letter from Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney General, to Roosevelt (Aug. 27, 1940),
PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 494-96.
241 See id. at 492.
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recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.,2"2 to argue that Roosevelt's powers as Commander in
Chief of the armed forces gave him such authority that Congress could
not hope to constitutionally limit his disposal of the ships. Curtiss-
Wright is a controversial opinion in United States jurisprudence.243 In
1936, the United States indicted several United States businesses,
including the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, for violating the
1934 Chaco Neutrality Act. The Chaco Neutrality Act forbade arms
sales in any place in the United States to the countries engaged in the
Chaco conflict if the President found that such a prohibition would
help reestablish peace.2' The indictment accused the defendants,
Curtiss-Wright and other arms manufacturers, of conspiring to sell
fifteen machine guns to Bolivia, which was involved in the Chaco
conflict. The defendants objected to the indictment on the grounds
inter alia that the Act was an invalid delegation of legislative power
to the Executive.245 The Supreme Court held that the resolution
concerned the foreign affairs of the United States246 and was therefore
well within the constitutional jurisdiction of the President. In the
strongest language, the Supreme Court declared in dicta that in the
"vast" field of foreign relations, "the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation," and, it mentioned in
other, more dubious dicta that the Senate may not interfere with the
President's "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power" to conduct
242 See id. at 486-87.
2 3 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power:
Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 Yale J. Int'l L. 5, 11-17 (1988) (For articles
criticizing Curtiss-Wright).
244 Chaco Neutrality Act, Ch. 365, 48 Stat. 811 (1934); see also Proclamation
Prohibiting Sale of Arms and Munitions of War To Countries Engaged in The Chaco
Conflict, 48 Stat. 1744 (1934).
25 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314 (1936).
246 See id. at 315.
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"foreign negotiations."47 Repeating its holding in an earlier case, the
Court emphasized that it "should hesitate long before limiting or
embarrassing such powers.'"248 Finally, the Court in dicta said that not
only could Congress delegate such powers to the President, but the
President's exercise of his powers in foreign relations "does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." '249
Jackson seized upon this holding to justify the destroyers-for-
bases deal. If, after all, the President's power is supreme (or
"plenary" in the words of Curtiss-Wright) in the foreign relations
sphere, Congress may not limit his power to dispose of ships or
munitions or make loans to foreign states. Indeed, Jackson asserted,
the Walsh Amendment, by daring to check the President's limitless
powers to dispose of Navy as he saw fit, "is of questionable
constitutionality."2 ' Jackson's efforts notwithstanding, however,
Roosevelt did not personally care much about the legality or the
constitutionality of the deal. As he wrote to King George VI, if he
had submitted his proposal to Congress as the "legalists" had wanted,
"it would still be in the tender care of the Committees of the
Congress!" '5 What he cared about was the public reaction, which
was generally favorable." 2 For Roosevelt, that settled the issue.
247 Id. at 319-20.
248 Id. at 322 (quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311(1915)).
249 Id. at 320.
' Letter from Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney General, to Roosevelt (Aug. 27, 1940),
PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 490.
"' Letter from Roosevelt to King George VI (Nov. 22, 1940), cited in SHOGAN, supra
note 4, 259.
252 However, Wendell Willkie, although uncritical of the deal, told reporters that he
thought Roosevelt's decision to avoid Congress was "regrettable." Shogan, supra
note 4, at 244.
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E. Escalating Aid, Vanishing Neutrality
The cancelled PT-boat sale, the Hell Diver sale, and
destroyers-for-bases deal were not Roosevelt's only attempts to sell
arms to Britain in violation of United States neutrality laws. Britain
badly needed bombers as well, and Roosevelt could not convince
Army Chief of Staff Marshall to declare any B-17 Flying Fortresses to
be unnecessary to national defense in conformity with the Walsh
Amendment.253 In November 1940 Roosevelt decided that the best
way to avoid legal obstacles was for American pilots to fly the
bombers to Britain for the alleged purpose of testing the planes under
combat conditions. Roosevelt declared this to be "the only peg on
which we could hang the proposition legally." '254 After securing the
agreement of Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson
brought the matter to the attention of the Justice Department,255 but
Assistant Attorney General Townsend informed Stimson that
Roosevelt's proposal would be illegal and unconstitutional -
Congress had "entire dominion" over United States property; United
States property "cannot be alienated without the consent and in the
manner prescribed by [sic] Congress."2 Instead, Townsend accepted
Stimson's proposal to sell B-17s to Britain out of existing stocks and
to replentish American defense forces out of the bombers on order by
Britain - an idea promptly implemented with the reluctant approval
of General Marshall. 57 In practice, this course of action amounted to
lending Britain bombers from American defense forces while the
British orders were being filled. Townsend's proposal seemed not
only to violate the Walsh Amendment by rendering American defense
253 See LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at 218.
254 Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary (Nov. 12, 1940), supra note 235, at 3-4.
255 See id. at 4-6.
I d. (Nov. 13, 1940) at 2.
257 See id.; id. (Nov. 15, 1940) at 1; Langer & Gleason, supra note 10, at 219.
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forces temporarily vulnerable, but if Congress indeed had "entire
dominion" over United States property, his proposal was as
unconstitutional as Roosevelt's.
When the Nazis finally attacked and declared war on the
Soviet Union (in that order) on June 22, 1941, Roosevelt agreed with
the Soviets not to invoke the 1939 Neutrality Act even though Hitler
had indeed declared war on the Soviet Union, so that he could send
them Lend-Lease aid.25' He stated publicly that he "did not believe it
to be in the interest of the security or the peace of the United States
to issue a proclamation of neutrality under the terms of the so-called
Neutrality Act., 259 Although the Russians were very grateful for
Roosevelt's agreement not to invoke the Act, his consent not to
invoke the Act demonstrated an evident pro-Soviet partiality that gave
the Nazis good reason to attack the United States. 260  Because
Roosevelt had already provoked the Nazis in many other ways,
Roosevelt thought it unlikely that his failure to invoke the 1939
Neutrality Act against the Soviets would cause a Nazi attack. As he
said in a 1940 press conference, states do not go to war "for legalistic
reasons." 1 Thus, by aiding the Soviets to defeat the more dangerous
Nazis instead of declaring neutrality, Roosevelt considered himself to
be fulfilling the terms of the 1939 Neutrality Act: "to promote the
security or preserve the peace... of the United States."
Roosevelt was almost certainly correct in his assessment of the
situation, but there is an element of hypocrisy in his refusal to put the
1939 Neutrality Act into effect. After all, the only reason that refusal
to invoke the Act would promote American security and peace was
" LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at 541.
29 Memorandum of Conversation from Sumner Welles, Acting U.S. Secretary of
State (June 26, 1941), 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 770.
26 See id. at 770.
261 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference on Dec. 17, 1940, reprinted in
PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 604, 609.
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because Roosevelt had provoked Hitler so much that this refusal was
only another straw on the camel's back. In that situation it would
indeed be better to help the Soviets. Roosevelt's numerous previous
unneutral and illegal acts had already made an eventual Nazi attack
probable. Hitler undoubtedly knew that an unneutral United States
would make the realization of his ambitions very difficult; a subjugated
United States, however, would present fewer difficulties. Thus, if
Roosevelt had not broken the law so many times before and had
maintained a "true neutrality," this first evidently unneutral act would
certainly provoke Nazi wrath against the United States and might
endanger its peace and security. On the other hand, given the
boundlessness of Nazi ambitions, an eventual attack on the United
States already seemed likely to Roosevelt, the only question being
when. Germany had not respected Belgian or Luxembourgeois
neutrality, why should it respect American neutrality?
Asking this question raises a related question: if Roosevelt felt
legally constrained to invoke the 1939 Neutrality Act when Germany
invaded Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, why
did he not invoke the Act when the Soviets invaded Finland and
Poland, or when Germany invaded the Soviet Union? The argument
that in the latter situations neutrality would not promote American
peace and security, while in the former situations neutrality would
promote peace and security, offers little merit. If American aid to
England or the Soviets did not provoke the Nazis, American aid to
Belgium or Luxembourg certainly would not provoke them either.
The only possible conclusion is that the peace and security of the
United States as envisioned by Congress were not Roosevelt's only
considerations. Comparing his actions with the terms of the 1939
Neutrality Act - which he obeyed even more scrupulously than the
earlier Neutrality Acts - it is evident that Roosevelt paid little heed
to the spirit of even that comparatively unrestrictive law.
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F. An End to The Pretense of Neutrality: The Lend-Lease Act
In December 1940 Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
made clear to Roosevelt that the British could no longer afford its
American arms on order.' 2 Roosevelt, undoubtedly remembering the
success of the destroyers-for-bases exchange, decided to
institutionalize a similar arrangement. He concocted the Lend-Lease
scheme in his typical style of solving problems as they arose and
letting others (in this case the Attorney General and the State
Department) worry about how to make it legal, or appear legal.263
The Lend-Lease Act,' proposed on January 10, 1941, and passed on
March 11 of the same year, allowed the President, "notwithstanding
the provisions of any other law," to build and sell arms, ammunition,
machinery, aircraft, vessels, or other defense goods to any country
whose defense the President deems "vital to the defense of the United
States." 65 It also authorized him to give freely ("transfer title"),
exchange, lease, lend, "or otherwise dispose of' defense goods to any
country, but only if, first, the President had consulted the Army's or
Navy's Chief of Staff, and second, the value of the articles did not
exceed $1,300 million.""' Moreover, Congress authorized the
President to repair or outfit foreign defense goods and to provide
foreign governments with defense information "pertaining to any
defense article for any such government." Section 2(b) of the Act
gave Roosevelt complete discretion to decide the terms of the "aid."
Finally, notwithstanding the "notwithstanding" language, section 3(e)
stated that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or
262 FEHRENBACH, supra note 6, at 196.
263 See Langer & Gleason, supra note 10, at 217.
264 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
2165 Id. at 31.
' Id Another limitation of the Act was that it did not allow American navy vessels
to convoy "vessels" sold under the Act. Id. at 32.
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permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a
combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 193 9.,267
While in force, the Lend-Lease Act effectively repealed the
major provisions (other than section 3 and the section 7 ban on private
loans) of the 1939 Neutrality Act, Title V of the 1917 Espionage Act,
and the Johnson Act.268  While the Lend-Lease Act seemed an
enormous delegation of power to Roosevelt in comparison with the
restrictions of the Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt evidently thought his
power still too closely regulated. The Roosevelt Administration hid
most of its weapons and vessel transfers to the Allies so that Congress
would not get suspicious about the value of U.S. aid; when it could
not hide its transfers it lied about their value outright.269 Roosevelt
feared the repercussions if Congress discovered the level of aid that
the U.S. was transferring; he did not want a still largely isolationist
Congress to accuse him of using American dollars to fight a European
war.
Roosevelt was obviously betting on the passage of the Lend-
Lease Act when he introduced it. Without telling Congress, he almost
immediately began authorizing orders from Britain for arms purchases,
including twenty-three thousand airplanes from November, well
beyond their financial means,"' and in February, 1941, rifles and
ammunition," both of which he goaded Marshall into approving. By
that point, though, Marshall was so used to giving illegal approval to
weapons transfers that he could joke about it - "I might as well be
267 Id.
2 Cf Memorandum fiom Oscar S. Cox, Legal Counsel to the U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
to Hany Hopkins, Personal Assistant to the President (Apr. 5, 1941), at 1-3 (on file
with FDR Lib.)(stating tie legal opinion that Lend-Lease Act authorizes shipment of
arms by U.S. government vessels to any port in the world).
269 Interview with Myres S. McDougal, supra note 182.
270 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 490.
271 See Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary (Feb. 5, 1941), supra note 235, at 1.
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hung for a sheep as a lamb" he told Secretary of War Stimson before
signing a transfer.1 2 Roosevelt even authorized the United States
government to purchase munitions manufacturing plants for the
United States military but secretly let the British use them instead. 3
In fact, Winston Churchill made this plain by a curious error, if it was
an error, in Their Finest Hour: "It must be remembered that our
munitions effort from the beginning of Lend-Lease in January 1941
was increased by over one-fifth through the generosity of the United
States."7 4 The Lend-Lease Act did not pass in January, of course, it
passed in March; the point is that Roosevelt began his program full
scale two months before Congress had legalized it. Secretary of War
Stimson felt troubled by the illegality and deception, but justified it to
himself in an ironically ambiguous phrase that may well summarize the
Roosevelt Administration's attitude during the entire course of its
statutory and constitutional violations: "I have no doubt that whatever
technicalities may intervene the purpose of our action will be
appreciated by the people eventually." '275
The passage of the Lend-Lease Act legally enabled Roosevelt
to "give freely" and unneutrally anything he wished to anyone he
wished within the lax requirements of the law. While fifty-four
percent of the public favored Lend-Lease after Roosevelt's "Arsenal
of Democracy" fireside chat,276 some Senate Republicans virulently
denounced the Lend-Lease Act as "a pure grant of power to the
President to do as he pleases with any foreign nation, for any purpose
on any terms he may see fit, to make available to any nation or
nations, any part, or the whole, of the military or naval power of the
272 Id.
273 See 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 506.
274 Id. at 7.
275 HENRY L. STIMSON MANuscRiPr DIARY (Jan. 22, 1941), at 1-2, supra note 235.
276 See FEHRENBACH, supra note 6, at 199.
A DIVORCE WAITING TO HAPPEN
United States., 277 Yet, if the President is supreme in the foreign
policy realm, as Secretary Hull believed, then clearly the Neutrality
Acts could not constitutionally limit his powers in the first place.278 In
that case, the Lend-Lease Act could not augment the President's
powers; rather, the Act was a restatement of his powers. The
question arises, then, whether Congress had the power to regulate the
President in the first place using neutrality legislation.
V. PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Although Congress retains the power to regulate foreign
commercez 9 and to support and fund armies and a navy,20 Roosevelt
claimed a constitutional right - indeed, a duty - to act freely in
foreign relations despite the Constitution's complete lack of direct
support for this arrogation of power.28' Attorney General Jackson's
interpretation of Curtiss-Wright added to his confidence about his
constitutional powers to flout congressional limitations on his conduct
of foreign relations. Roosevelt may have been influenced by the
writings and speeches of the two Presidents he admired most - his
cousin Theodore and Woodrow Wilson. Theodore Roosevelt, whom
Franklin adulated, envisaged an expansive role for the executive
27 Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Minority view of Promoting the Defense of the
United States (Lend-Lease), SEN. REP. NO. 45 pt. 2, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1941).
278 See I HuLL, supra note 7, at 413.
279 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
n8o Id. art. I, § 8, el. 12, 13.
2' See supra text accompanying note 117. Roosevelt supposedly based his claims
upon the Article II, § 2 powers conferred upon the President as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy, and his power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. See
also I Hull, supra note 7, at 413 (arguing that 1935 Neutrality Act infringed
President's constitutional power to conduct foreign relations).
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branch. He was the first President to assert powers extensively that
were not enumerated in the Constitution. His "stewardship theory"
of the presidency assumed that the President enjoyed all powers not
specifically denied to him. In his own words,
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in
my Administration ... was my insistence upon the
theory that the executive power was limited only by
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its
Constitutional powers .... I declined to adopt the
view that what was imperatively necessary for the
Nation could not be done by the President unless he
could find some specific authorization to do it. My
belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to
do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution
or by the laws.282
By claiming that he denied himself powers "forbidden by the
Constitution," Theodore Roosevelt was referring to powers explicitly
forbidden by the Constitution. Both Roosevelts believe that these
"specific restrictions and prohibitions" did not always include those
appearing in the Tenth Amendment. The foreign policy of both
Roosevelts was based on an expansive doctrine that made the
President's role more akin to that of the eighteenth-century King of
England than the Founding Fathers would have liked.
As for Woodrow Wilson, Bishop G. Ashton Oldham said to
Roosevelt in an open letter, "[y]ou were not only the friend but are the
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 371-72 (1913).
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heir of Wilson's policies and ideals." '283 Friends and acquaintances
were constantly comparing him to Wilson and sending him books by
and about Wilson.284 Roosevelt himself agreed that "the problems of
American neutrality which confronted Woodrow Wilson at the
beginning of the World War were very much like the problems which
face the Administration today and are likely to assume increasing
gravity in the period just ahead of us."28
In 1908 Wilson set forth his views on the President's
constitutional relationship with Congress in the exercise of his foreign
relations powers:
One of the greatest of the President's powers I have
not yet spoken of at all: his control, which is very
absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The
initiative in foreign affairs, which the President
possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually
the power to control them absolutely.286
Wilson's expansive interpretation of the President's foreign relations
power, though later echoed by the Curtiss-Wright opinion, floundered
in practice. His virile beliefs sunk American ratification of the Treaty
of Versailles and the League of Nations Charter by alienating the
' Letter from G. Ashton Oldham, Bishop, Diocese of Albany, to Roosevelt (Oct. 31,
1935), reprinted in 3 FDR & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 47, 49.
' E.g., Letter from William E. Dodd, U.S. Ambassador in Germany, to R. Walton
Moore, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State (Aug. 31, 1936), reprinted in 3 id. at 405,
408 n.8.; Letter from Ray Stannard Baker to Roosevelt (Nov. 1, 1935), reprinted in
id. at 49, 49-50 & n. 1.
' Letter from Roosevelt to Ray Stannard Baker (Nov. 13, 1935), reprinted in 3 id.
at 60.
286 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL COVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77
(1908).
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Senate. Roosevelt seems to have learned a lesson from Wilson's
experience - not that, in the exercise of his foreign relations power
the President should consult Congress during treaty negotiations, but
that when politically feasible the President should neither consult
Congress nor negotiate a treaty.
The unqualified and sparsely supported belief in the "very
absoluteness" of the President's foreign relations power expressed by
Wilson and the Curtiss-Wright opinion has little to recommend it.
The Court's strong wording finds little support in the Constitution or
in historical practice. The Constitution does not confer a "vast"
foreign affairs power on the President, and certainly not a "plenary"
power. By both custom and necessity the President has plenary
negotiating power, but he certainly does not have plenary power to
bindthe United States in foreign negotiations. It is indisputable that
the Constitution confers considerable foreign affairs powers on the
Senate and Congress. Rather, in Edward Corwin's words, "[w]hat the
Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the President
certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain
other powers of the same general kind on the Senate, and still other
such powers on Congress." '287 Similarly, Edwin Borchard argued in
1940 that while "[c]ertainly the President is the 'sole organ of the
nation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign
relations,' as [John] Marshall said in 1800.... [t]his speaks merely of
agency, but not of power to conclude and bind the nation in
fundamental matters., 28' The power to involve the United States in
a war (or not, by a declaration of neutrality), to create foreign policy,
or to dispose of United States property are among these fundamental
matters of foreign relations that the Constitution reserves for
287 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 171
(1957).
BORCHARD, supra note 227, at 691.
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Congress.
In fact, although Jackson and Acheson relied heavily on
Curtiss-Wright's legally feeble dicta,289 one court, albeit a district
court, cited Curtiss-Wright to limit the President's power. The court
in Suspine v. Compania Transatlantica Centroamericana held that
the 1939 Neutrality Act was a constitutionally valid exercise of
Congress' power over foreign commerce.2' The Suspine court
repeated Curtiss-Wright's holding that a congressional practice
evidenced by over a century of repetition "goes a long way in the
direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for the
constitutionality of the practice."29' The practice in Suspine's case
was Congress' control over the foreign arms trade. The district court
correctly held that only Congress controlled foreign commerce.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright emphasized
the President's power to conduct foreign negotiations,292 not his
power to actually dispose of arms, funds, planes, or vessels.
Commerce in weapons - even by barter, loan, or exchange 293 _ is
foreign commerce by any definition.
On the other hand, outright transfers, loans, sale, or barter at
289 Ironically, when confronted with Curtiss-Wright as a precedent for broad
presidential powers, Robert Jackson as Chief Justice dismissed the argument, pointing
out that "much of the opinion is dictum." Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
636 n.2 (1952).
' Suspine v. Compania Transaflantica Centroamericana, S.A., 37 F. Supp. 268, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); see also HENKIN, supra note 229, at 95 (President has no power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations).
"' Id. at 315 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
322, 327, 328 (1934)).
' See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20 (referring to President's
power to "speak or listen" as representative of nation).
293 Economically, foreign commerce must ultimately amount to barter in any case.
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rates more favorable than the market might qualify as foreign aid,294
the control of which Presidents have, since the 1960s at least, claimed
control. This claim, however, is misguided. While the President
might feel free to negotiate foreign aid agreements, Congress retains
ultimate control of foreign assistance for several compelling reasons.
One is that Congress holds the purse strings, and foreign aid is almost
always a budgetary matter. Another is that foreign aid is closely
related to commerce, which Congress controls by explicit
constitutional authority. A final reason is that nowhere does the
Constitution even hint that the President can dispose freely of United
States property, a quintessentially congressional power as discussed
below.2 95
Returning to a more detailed consideration of the destroyers-
for-bases deal, Acheson's arguments can be easily disposed of. First,
it seems obvious that Acheson misread section 14 of the Walsh
Amendment to confer authority on the President to transfer arms
when in reality the Amendment simply added an obstacle to any
authority the President might previously have possessed. 29  The
Amendment did not say that the President may transfer, exchange,
sell, or otherwise dispose of military weapons and vessels with the
approval of the Army Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations.297
The Amendment stipulated that "[n]otwithstanding the provision of
any other law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft,
munitions, supplies or equipment" owned by the United States may
be sold by the President absent consent by the appropriate
" See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 Yale J.
Int'l L. 69, 71 (1988).
15 See infra notes 302, 303 and 307-311 and accompanying text.
26 For a summary of Acheson's argument, see supra text accompanying note 325.
2 See BRIGs, supra note 224, at 574.
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aforementioned officials." 8 Thus, only if the President had some other
statutory or constitutional power could he dispose of the equipment
and vessels; the Walsh Amendment granted him no such authority.
The Walsh Amendment was a restriction on the President's power,
not a grant of authority. Moreover, the Walsh Amendment only
authorized the sale of the ships, not their barter.
Acheson also argued that as long as the ships were sold to
private companies first, the 1939 Neutrality Act was no obstacle to
the transfer. Putting aside any academic cavil about how this course
of action would violate the spirit of the 1939 Act, the point is moot
because Roosevelt never sold the destroyers to a private company.
The transfer therefore violated the provisions of the 1939 Neutrality
Act as well as title V, section 3 of the 1917 Espionage Act.
Jackson's argument presents a somewhat more convincing
justification, yet it too is deeply flawed. While admitting that the
Curtiss-Wright decision did not confer "unlimited" power on the
President in foreign relations, Jackson argued that because destroyers-
for-bases deal was an exchange not requiring an allocation of funds,
Congress did not need to approve the deal.299 Jackson knew that
Congress appropriates funds for the Navy under its Article II, Section
8 powers, and he tried to get around that fact by combining a national
security argument with an argument that the destroyers-for-bases
transfer did not require an immediate allocation of funds. The main
error in this argument is that there is no legal difference between a
past congressional allocation of funds and a future one. The trade or
transfer of destroyers in the past required Congress to allocate funds
for their construction, maintenance, and improvement. Moreover,
298 ACT OF JUNE 28, 1940, ch. 440, § 14(a), 54 Stat. 676,681 (1940) (emphasis
added).
2 Letter from Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney General, to Roosevelt (Aug. 27, 1940),
PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 487.
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United States acquisition of the bases would require-fulure financial
allocations for upkeep and adaptation to American purposes. The
President may not exchange or transfer Navy vessels or agree to buy
naval bases without congressional approval merely because the
President believes that such an exchange or transfer improves national
security. That view may lead to absurd and very dangerous
consequences; indeed, by this logic the President would be
constitutionally authorized in some circumstances to give the entire
Navy to a foreign government, and any legislation attempting to
prevent the transfer would be "unconstitutional." 3" Such a result is,
of course, constitutionally unthinkable. Roosevelt himself proclaimed,
after a Nazi submarine attacked the U.S.S. Kearny, that American
military vessels do not only belong to the Navy, they "belong to every
man, woman, and child in this Nation."3"1  Nowhere does the
Constitution state or imply that the President may freely dispose of the
property of the federal government. Implicit in Congress' power to
provide for and maintain the Navy is Congress' power to keep the
President from giving it away. It is emphatically the province of
Congress, and of Congress alone, to regulate foreign commerce and
to acquire and dispose of United States property.0 2 This principle
follows not only from Congress' commerce power, but from its war
power as well. As the Chief Justice John Marshall noted, the
commerce power "may be, and often is, used as an instrument of
war."30 3  The Justice Department gave Roosevelt precisely this
300 CORWIN, supra note 230, at E6.
30 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, NAVY AND TOTAL DEFENSE DAY ADDRESS, OcT. 27,
1941, reprinted in 4 DocuMENTs ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 27, 27 (Leland
I Goodrich ed., 1942) [hereinafter DocuMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS].
302 See HENKIN, supra note 229, at 77, 95, 99.
' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 WHEAT.) 1, 190 (1824). In further support of this
point, in 1868 the Senate considered whether to allow the President power to suspend
commercial relations with a country for wrongfully detaining an American citizen.
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conservative advice in response to the President's proposal to use
American bombers in the British war: Congress has "entire dominion"
over United States property and commerce.3 The provisions of the
Constitution could not be clearer on this point: "The Congress shall
have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States .... ,", If the Constitution forbade the President to give away
public property, as Roosevelt admitted it did,30 then Congress' "entire
dominion" also forbade the President to sell or trade away public
property without congressional approval. Indeed, Roosevelt explicitly
recognized Congress' authority in his initial reply to Churchill's
request for destroyers3 7 and in a telegram denying a similar request
for aid in weapons in June 1940, from the French: "These statements
carry with them no implication of military commitments. Only
Congress can make such commitments. 30 8
Congress had already made manifest its opinion on the
unconstitutionality of Roosevelt disposing freely of American
Although the Senate passed the statute then under consideration (which is still
effective today), it denied the President this power after a speech by Senator Charles
Sumner. In that speech, Sumner excoriated the embargo clause: "Here is a way to
make war easy. To the President is given this alarming power... By the Constitution
of our Republic it is Congress alone that can declare war. And yet by this bill One
Man, in his discretion, may do little short of declaring war. He may hurl one of the
bolts of war, and sever the commercial relations of two great Powers." See Louis
FISHER, PRESIDETAL WAR POWER 37 (1995).
304 Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary (Nov. 13, 1940), 2 (on file with Stimson
Papers).
305 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
306 See I HuLL, supra note 7, at 835-37 ("[T]he President had no authority to give
away Government property .... Mr. Roosevelt at once agreed with me.").
307 See supra text accompanying note 192.
3" Telegram from Roosevelt to Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State (June 1,
1940), quoted in Tansill, supra note 210, at 591.
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munitions. Two weeks prior to Roosevelt's June 3, 1940 sale of arms
to Britain and France through a front corporation, Senator Claude
Pepper of Florida had introduced a bill in Congress that would have
allowed the President to sell for cash any planes to Britain that the
United States could replace from current orders.3' He further
introduced a concurrent resolution to allow the President to use his
"full authority ... under existing laws to sell or transfer airplanes and
war material not at present needed in the national defense to any
foreign country... ,,310 Both proposals were defeated in the Foreign
Relations Committee, the latter after a lengthy debate in which several
senators denied that the President could give away or sell government
property on his own authority and claimed that the proposed bill
would violate international law.311
Another dangerous consequence is the negation of the
President's constitutional obligation not to provoke probable war.
The Constitution assigns to Congress alone the authority to declare
war312 and to utthorize war,313 it follows inexorably that the President
" S.J. Res. 259/263,76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong. Rec. 6768-70 (1940).
310 S. Con. Res. 49, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong. Rec. 7649 (1940).
31 Id. at 6769-70 (statement of Sen. Claude Pepper), 7649-64 (statements of Sens.
Josiah Bailey, Homer Bone, and Schwellenbach); Kimball, supra note 11, at 46.
312 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316,
1317-18, 1319-20 (1973) (President may not initiate war or bomb foreign country on
sole authority); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) ("By the
Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war....
[The President] has no power to initiate or declare a war ... against a foreign
nation.").
' While this conclusion follows logically from the text of the Constitution and the
lack of any assignment of power to initiate war to the President, the conclusion also
finds support in the Constitution's delegation to Congress alone (as opposed to the
executive, which was the British practice) of the power to issue letters of marque and
reprisal and to make rules concerning captures on land and sea. U.S. Const., art. I, §
8, cl. 11.
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must take reasonable precautions within his constitutional and legal
authority to avoid gratuitously provoking another state to declaring
war," 4 particularly if such war would violate the will of Congress as
it clearly did from 1935 until 1941. Secretary of State Cordell Hull
flatly contradicted this principle in the Senate hearings on the Lend-
Lease Bill, stating matter-of-factly that
[T]he President or even any naval officer in command
of a ship could commit an act of war any hour or any
day in the year in normal times .... under all the
general authority that [the President] has there is every
kind of way to commit an act of [war] if the Executive
desires to do it.3' "
Yet, this was a description of the President's factual abilities, not his
legal powers. In 1935 John Bassett Moore set forth his views:
I have occasionally heard the suggestion that there can
be no objection to conferring on the President
dictatorial powers as regards peace and war because,
forsooth, he can, in the exercise of his constitutional
power as Commander in Chief of the Army and the
Navy, or in the conduct of diplomatic intercourse, at
any moment plunge the country into war. I utterly
deny this. There is only one case in which the
President is empowered to use the military forces for
purposes of war without the express authority of
314 See CORWIN, supra note 230, at 7E.
3" Lend-Lease Bill: Hearings before the Comm. on Foreign Aff., House of Reps.
(H.R. 1776, Public Law No. 11), approved Mar. 11, 1941, at 24.
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Congress, and that is to repel invasion. The use of any
of his powers so as to plunge the country into war
would be a palpable violation of the Constitution and
of his oath of office.316
Moore's view agrees not only with the crystal-clear provisions of the
Constitution, but with the records of the Constitutional Convention317
and the weight of historical custom. 31 ' The Supreme Court took the
President's duty in this regard for granted in The Prize Cases, noting
that the President "has no power to initiate or declare a war. '3 9 The
principle at issue here is the separation of powers, namely, the sword
and the purse.3 2' As James Madison wrote:
316 7 JoHN BAssETT MooRE, THE Cou.LEC1I PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETr Mooa 53-54
(1944) [hereinafter MOORE].
317 See FISHER, supra note 304, at 4, 6.
318 To take two of many possible examples, President George Washington refused to
engage in any offensive operations against the Creek Nation in these terms: "The
Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive
expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the
subject, and authorized such a measure." 33 George Washington, The Writings of
George Washington 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). Similarly, President William
Taft refused to intervene in Mexico to protect American lives and property without
congressional approval. He "seriously doubt[ed]" that he had the power "under any
circumstances" to send troops to Mexico without congressional approval. See FISHER,
supra note 304, at 49-50.
"" The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) (emphasis added); see also
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 591 (1889) (holding that President has
no authority to order "aggressive hostilities"); 5 MOORE, supra note 317, at 29, 30-31
(1944) (contradicting Corwin's 1917 contention that Congress has less than exclusive
power to declare war).
.. At the Constitutional Convention, George Mason advocated that the "purse & the
sword ought never to get into the same hands." I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENrION OF 1787, at 139-40 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
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Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature
of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war
ought to be commenced, contintued, or concluded.
They are barred from the latter functions by a great
principle in free government, analogous to that which
separates the sword from the purse, or the power of
executing from the power of enacting laws.32'
Absent a congressional declaration of war, the sole power and duty
conferred upon the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces is to repel sudden attacks. 22
Not only does Congress alone have the power to declare war,
but since the first neutrality law in 1794,' 2 Congress has held the
corollary power to determine that the United States will remain
neutral in a conflict.324 In debates over the interpretation of the
Constitution in The Gazette of the United States, both Hamilton and
his opponent Madison (backed by Jefferson)32 disagreed upon this
321 6 MADISON, supra note 229, at 148 (emphasis in original).
322 See FISHER, supra note 304, at 4, 6, 11-12.
323 Act of June 5, 1794, reprinted in 2 FRANCIS DtAK & PHILIP C. JESSUP, A
COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS
COUNTRIES 1079 (1939).
324 See CORWIN, supra note 288, at 181; HENKIN, supra note 229, at 85, 99, 106
("[S]ince President Washington's day neutrality has been determined by
Congress ... ."). See generally FENWICK, supra note 48, at 15-25 (describing first
United States neutrality law).
325 Cf Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793) (urging
Madison to "take up [his] pen" against excesses of Pacificus's "most striking
heresies"), reprinted in 6 Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 338,
338-39 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). Madison responded that, although he was in
no mood to take up the debate, Pacificus's argument "excites equally surprise &
indignation, and ought certainly to be taken notice of by some one who can do it
justice." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1793), reprinted
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limitation to the President's powers. Hamilton, writing as "Pacificus"
in favor of extensive presidential power, argued that the President has
the authority to declare neutrality.326 Congress may not declare
neutrality:
The legislative department is not the organ of
intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations. It is charged neither with making nor
interpreting treaties. It is therefore not naturally that
member of the government which is to pronounce on
the existing conditioh of the nation with regard to
foreign powers .. 327
According to Hamilton, the constitutional limitations on the power to
make treaties and declare war - both "executive" in character in
Hamilton's view - are exceptions to the general rule that the
President retains all executive authority. The power to declare
neutrality, Hamilton said, is an executive power not explicitly
delegated to Congress and therefore must be undertaken by the
President.328 He argued that although Congress alone may declare
war, it is "the duty of the executive to preserve peace till the
declaration is made."3 9 Even if this were not true, Hamilton argued,
the President still has concurrent power with Congress to judge
whether the legislature is under an obligation to declare neutrality and
war.33° On the other hand, the President may "affect the exercise of
in 6 MADIsoN, supra note 229, at 135. About one month later, that "some one"
turned out to be himself
326 4 HAMILTON, supra note 229, at 436.
327 Id.
328 See id. at 439.
329 See id.
330 See id.
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the power of the legislature to declare war" through his executive
function, yet "the executive cannot thereby control the exercise" of
the legislature's power to declare war. "The legislature is still free to
perform its duties, according to its own sense of them .... It is the
province and duty of the executive to preserve to the nation the
blessions of peace. The Legislature alone can interrupt them by
placing the nation in a state of war." '331
Hamilton misinterpreted the Constitution's grant of power for
several reasons. First, he was incorrect in asserting that the legislature
does not make treaties. The President may negotiate treaties, but only
the Senate may "make" a treaty the law. Hamilton's expansive
interpretation of which powers are "executive" in character, which by
his account included the treaty making power, simply is not justified.
In addition, Hamilton failed to recognize the distinction between
declaring neutrality and remaining nonbelligerent. If neither Congress
nor the President declares neutrality, yet the government of the United
States refrains from any action that would justify a belligerent
declaring war on the United States, the United States remains in a de
facto state of neutrality. The President's duty to preserve the peace
in the absence of a congressional declaration of war does not therefore
require the President to proclaim United States neutrality. The
records of the Constitutional Convention make clear that many the
delegates were concerned that the powers of peace and war would not
be in the hands of the President.332 Yet, even if the President did have
this power, Congress would also have a concurrent power to declare
neutrality that could override the President's decision not to declare
neutrality.
Madison, publishing under the name "Helvidius," pointed out
different but equally important flaws in Hamilton's arguments.
331 Id.
332 See FISHER, supra note 304, at 4, 6.
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Madison interpreted the Constitution to confer the foreign policy
power mainly upon the Congress by virtue of its power to declare
war. He denied Hamilton's argument that declarations of war or
neutrality are executive acts.
A declaration that there shall be war, is not an
execution of laws: it does not suppose pre-existing
laws to be executed: it is not, in any respect, an act
merely executive. It is, on the contrary, one of the
most deliberate acts that can be performed; and when
performed, has the effect of repealing all the laws
operating in a state of peace, so far as they are
inconsistent with a state of war; and of enacting, as a
rule for the executive, a new code adapted to the
relation between the society and its foreign enemy. In
like manner, a conclusion of peace annuls all the laws
peculiar to a state of war, and revives the general laws
incident to a state of peace.333
Madison used Hamilton's own earlier words against him, citing
Hamilton's arguments in The Federalist o the effect that treaties were
laws that the legislature should review and enact.334 As for Hamilton's
333 6 MADISON, supra note 229, at 145.
311 See id at 15 1. Specifically, Hamilton said:
[I]f we attend carefully to [the nature of the power to make
treaties], it will be found to partake more of the legislative than of
the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall
within the definition of either of them... [T]he vast importance of
the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the
participation of the whole or a part of the legislative body in the
office of making them.
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argument that the President had concurrent power to declare
neutrality or war, Madison had nothing but scorn.
Observe, how he struggles in his toils. He had before
admitted, that the right to declare war is vested in the
legislature. He here admits, that the right to declare
war includes the right to judge, whether the United
States be obliged to declare war or not. Can the
inference be avoided, that the executive, instead of
having a similar right to judge, is as much excluded
from the right to judge as from the right to declare?
The power of the legislature to declare war, and judge
of the causes for declaring it, is one of the most
express and explicit parts of the constitution. To
endeavour to abridge or affect it by strained
inferences, and by hypothetical or singular
occurrences, naturally warns the reader of some
lurking fallacy.335
The President cannot in any circumstances "lay the legislature under
an obligation to decide in favour of war," as Hamilton argued. In
essence, Madison pointed out, Pacificus was simultaneously arguing
that the legislature is constitutionally free to decide when to declare
However proper or safe it may be in governments where the
executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him
the entire power of making treaties, in would be utterly unsafe and
improper to entrust that power to an elective magistrate of four
years duration. The Federalist No. 75, supra note 103, at 379-80
(Alexander Hamilton).
... Id. at 152-53.
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war, yet constitutionally bound by the judgment of the President.336
The Constitution could contemplate no such self-contradiction.
Rather, the power to declare war or neutrality "isfully and exclusively
vested in the legislature.
337
Madison viewed the President's powers in foreign relations as
decidedly limited, but Madison's interpretation logically and
historically fit the architecture of the Constitution much better than
Hamilton's. Because the President retained initiative in the foreign
relations sphere, subsequent practice showed Presidents to be in an
advantageous position to advance Hamilton's less persuasive
interpretation to their own benefit. Insofar as Presidents have
historically felt free to declare neutrality during insurrections and civil
wars in neighboring countries, Hamilton's position that the President
had concurrent (though not exclusive) power to declare neutrality
(but not war) has prevailed defacto.338 Nonetheless, Congress' power
to determine neutrality and to force the President to enforce it has
gone unquestioned since the Pacificus-Helvidius debates. By
committing blatantly unneutral acts - like the destroyers-for-bases
deal and his failure to declare neutrality in the Sino-Japanese war
despite a clear statutory mandate - Roosevelt infringed both
Congress' right to determine the United States's neutrality and
Congress' right (on which both Hamilton and Madison agreed) to
declare war "according to its own sense." Roosevelt also thereby
failed in his Article II, Section 3 duty to execute faithfully the laws of
336 See id. at 170- 7 1.
3 Id. at 174.
331 In 1940, Quincy Wright argued without qualification that "[i]in fact, Hamilton's
view, insisting that [the power to declare neutrality] belonged to the President, has
prevailed .... Wright, supra note 135, at 304. Wright was incorrect insofar as no
constitutional authority has ever denied Congress' power to declare neutrality, even
against the wishes of the President, or to declare war in the face of the President's
proclamation of neutrality.
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the United States. Certainly, insofar as the 1937 Act was a valid
limitation on the President's powers to conduct foreign relations,
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution required Roosevelt to
interpret and apply the provisions of the 1937 Neutrality Act in good
faith. Roosevelt acknowledged publicly that if "war breaks out we
have perfectly definite legislation covering the subject. Simply a
question of following the legislation." '339 Thus, when reasonable doubt
existed as to whether a war had begun, ended, or spread to new
countries, the President retained discretion. He was constitutionally
obliged to apply that discretion "faithfully" - i.e., consistently with
the letter and spirit of the law.340
When questioned by reporters, Roosevelt eschewed discussion
of legal technicalities and relied on different historical precedents to
justify the constitutionality of the destroyers-for-bases deal. He
repeatedly compared the destroyers-for-bases deal to the Louisiana
Purchase,3 4' although when he mentioned that the Purchase was
negotiated without congressional approval, he did not label it an
unconstitutional act. Instead, he repeated that "there was nothing said
about it in the Constitution. ' 342  He did mention that Jefferson
requested Congress' blessing and appropriations ex postfacto, but he
incorrectly stated that the Louisiana Purchase was never submitted to
or ratified by the Senate as a treaty. In fact, Jefferson drafted a treaty
and submitted it to the Senate after negotiating and signing the
3"' Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference of Sept. 13, 1935, reprinted in 3 FDR &
FOREIGN AFFAIRS supra note 5, at 7.
340 See supra text accompanying note 127.
31' E.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference of Sept. 3, 1940, reprinted in
PUBLICPAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 375, 376, 378, 380-81; Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Message to Congress Regarding the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal (Sept. 3,
1940), reprinted in ROOSEVELT, supra note 18, at 273, 274.
342 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference of Sept. 3, 1940, reprinted in PUBLIC
PAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91, at 381.
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Purchase. Roosevelt, by contrast, never asked Congress at all, even
after the deal was consummated. When asked about Jackson's
opinion on the relevancy of the Louisiana Purchase, Roosevelt told
reporters that he thought Jackson had also mentioned the Purchase in
his brief supporting the deal.343 Jackson had actually written that the
Louisiana Purchase was not "strictly pertinent" as a precedent.3"
As for Jackson's national security nuance, it seems hard to
believe that Roosevelt's powers as Commander-in-Chief can justify
an otherwise unconstitutional action in the absence of a clear threat to
the safety of the state. True, the foreign affairs power is a delicate one
that requires the President to balance the public's interest in open and
honest government with the need to accomodate the peremptory
necessity of maintaining national security. The force of this objection
cannot be denied, and the Roosevelt Administration repeatedly
announced its belief that the security of Britain was necessary for the
defense of the United States. In Roosevelt's publicly expressed view,
so long as Britain would fight Germany, American weapons were as
good or better in British hands as in American hands. Yet, broad
interpretations of what improves "national security" or "self-defense"
as history has recurrently shown, are rife with potential for fantastic
abuse.345 In fact, in 1966 a legal adviser to the U.S. Department of
343 Id.
' Letter from Robert Jackson, U.S. Attorney General, to Roosevelt (Aug. 27, 1940),
reprinted in id. at 487-88.
" A case in point is President George Bush's 1989 decision to invade Panama. The
U.S. Ambassador to Panama justified the invasion on grounds of self-defense.
According to his theory, the fact that the Panamanian government allowed or assisted
the smuggling of drugs to the United States constituted "aggression" against the
United States and therefore justified invasion in "self-defense." See FISHER, supra
note 304, at 147-48 (1995). President William Clinton provided another example
when he ordered the firing of missiles into the capital of Iraq to punish the Iraqi
government for an alleged attempt to assassinate George Bush. Needless to say,
"calling the U.S. bombing of Iraq an act of self-defense for an assassination plot that
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State publicly characterized the United States' right of self-defense
(and the President's right to use armed forces without congressional
approval) in these terms: "An attack on a country far from our shores
can impinge directly on the nation's security. In the SEATO treaty,
for example, it is formally declared that an armed attack against Viet-
Nam would endanger the peace and safety of the United States." 3"
Needless to say, no reasonable definition of the President's duty of
self-defense goes so far. In a democratic society with a Constitution
that speaks as clearly on the issue of checks and balances as the
United States Constitution does, the "national security" power must
be narrowly construed. In this light, considering the lack of immediate
threat to the United States at the time; Roosevelt's knowledge and
belief that arms shipments and transfers to Britain seriously impaired
the ability of the United States Army and Navy to defend itself against
a potential attack;347 and the fact that Roosevelt's unneutral actions
had been averted two months previously is quite a stretch." Michael Ratner & Jules
Lobel, Bombing Baghdad: Illegal Reprisal or Self-Defense?, LEGAL TIMEs, July 5,
1993, at 24.
3' LEONARD C. MEEKER, 54 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 474, 484 (1966) (emphasis added).
347 See SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 76, 87. Despite widespread public support for
increasing the United States armed forces, see Stronger Defense Backed by Voters,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1940, at 30, it was the Roosevelt Administration's policy to
improve not the national security of the United States, but the security of Britain even
at the expense ofAinefican defense needs. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told the
New York Tines on November 15, 1940, that the Roosevelt Administration's policy
was to give Britain "every possible degree of aid short of leaving ourselves
defenseless." LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at 221. In reality, the Roosevelt
Administration was redirecting American arms to Britain on such a scale that, had
Germany or Japan launched a full-scale attack against the United States at the time
Knox made that statement, the United States would have in fact been virtually
defenseless. Cf., e.g., 2 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 126 (redirecting arms
production to Britain left U.S. Army with minimum equipment required for national
defense); KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 44-45 (describing Army reluctance to sell arms
to Britain due to shortage in United States); LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at
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themselves helped to provoke the Axis powers into attacking in the
first place, it seems highly doubtful that national security
considerations would have justified many or even any of Roosevelt's
violations of the neutrality laws and the Constitution, unless Britain
were considered one of the American states.
The destroyers-for-bases deal did not only infringe on
Congress' commerce and war powers, as explained above it also
violated the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1939 Neutrality Act as well
and thereby infringed on Congress' constitutional prerogatives in
another way. Because destroyers-for-bases violated existing neutrality
laws, Roosevelt needed prior legislative approval for the deal, which
he did not seek until 1941. Given the many ways in which the deal
infringed upon Congress' constitutional prerogatives, the only correct
215, 218-20, 736 (describing Army reluctance to sell B-24 and B-17 bombers to
Britain due to shortage in United States); id. at 228 (after destroyers-for-bases deal
American stocks of planes and destroyers were "dangerously low"); I MORISON,
supra note 215 ("During the U-boat blitz off our Atlantic Coast early in 1942, one of
the high-ranking admirals in Washington wrote to Stark saying he wished we had
those fifty destroyers and ten cutters."); SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 80-81; Telegram
from Roosevelt to Winston Churchill (May 16, 1940), reprinted in 3 FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 5 (Roosevelt claims United States cannot even spare old
ships). As the New York Times pointed out, bases are not very useful to national
defense in the absence of planes and ships. SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 250.
The massive American shipping losses in 1942 in the Caribbean and
Bermuda exemplify well that the United States needed the vessels and weapons it was
transferring to the Allies for its own defense. See generally MORISON, supra note
215, at 413-14. Indeed, German U-boats even managed to lay mines off of Boston,
Delaware, Chesapeake Bay, New York, and elsewhere. See id. at app. IV. Yet,
knowing that the Navy was spread dangerously thin, Roosevelt nonetheless continued
to transfer ships to Britain. For example, in March 1941 Roosevelt gave ten Coast
Guard cutters to Britain when Secretary Knox insisted that the Navy could give up no
more destroyers. See LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at 424.
For a summary of comparative naval strengths in late 1939, see generally 1
CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at app. F.
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procedure to implement the destroyers-for-bases deal would have
been for Roosevelt either to draft a treaty, which in turn requires
senatorial approval, or simply to request legislative approval from
Congress.
Roosevelt knew of his duty to consult Congress, and
communicated to Winston Churchill in a telegram on May 16, 1940:
"As you know a step of that kind [i.e., lending or selling destroyers to
Britain] could not be taken except with the specific authorization of
the Congress .... 3 48 The only reason that Roosevelt did not finally
seek a bill was, of course, because he knew Congress would not
approve of the exchange.349 Indeed, before announcing the deal
publicly on September 2, 1940, Roosevelt himself twice admitted that
he "might get impeached for what he was about to do." ' Indeed, if
Roosevelt really had believed the destroyers-for-bases deal to be
within his constitutional power there would never have been any legal
need for the Lend-Lease Act.35'
VI. ROOSEVELT'S DELICATE BALANCE
Winston Churchill quoted Roosevelt as telling him: "I may
never declare war; I may make war. 352 This disrespect for his
constitutional duties typifies Roosevelt's pre-World War II behavior
and explains the fears of his contemporaries that he was usurping
34 Telegram from Roosevelt to Winston Churchill [alias "Formal Naval Person"]
(May 16, 1940), reprinted in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 5 at 49, 49-50
(1957).
" See id. at 49-50; Memorandum by President Roosevelt (Aug. 2, 1940), reprinted
in id. at 58, 58-59.
350 1 DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, THE JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL 209 (1964).
351 Cf HENKiN, supra note 229, at 77 ("[Congress'] power to acquire and dispose of
property has supported lend-lease and other arms programs .....
352 3 CHURCHILL, supra note 96, at 528.
1996-97] 509
510 BUFFALO JOURATAL OFINTERATATIONAL LAW [Vol.3
power from Congress in a "dictator-like" fashion. Roosevelt seems
to have consistently, even deliberately overestimated the extent of his
constitutional authority as President. To achieve his foreign policy
goals, he claimed powers that were clearly not his and neglected his
Article II duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. He
repeatedly infringed upon Congress' exclusive power to determine the
neutrality of the United States, 353 to regulate commerce,354 and to
dispose of United States property.3 " In a disgraceful failure of
leadership and moral vision, he not only let Congress pass neutrality
legislation allowing fascists to take over Spain, he encouraged it.
Meanwhile, he abused his duties under the other neutrality acts. It
must have been difficult for him to make sound legal judgments when
his legal advisers - Edward Foley and Oscar Cox (Treasury), Green
Hackworth (State), Ben V. Cohen (Interior), Francis Biddle (Solicitor
General), Robert Jackson (Attorney General), even the comparatively
objective Newman Townsend (Justice) - were so often "yes-men."
He and his legal advisers consistently "adopted the easy amorality of
the end justifying the means., '356 As Harry Hopkins put it, "I want to
M5 See supra text accompanying note 324.
311 See generally HENKIN, supra note 229, at 95 (President "cannot unilaterally
regulate commerce with foreign nations").
311 See generally id. (President "cannot ...dispose of American territory or
property").
31 MILLER, supra note 17, at 327. The salty Henry Stimson, then Secretary of War,
attended a meeting of Frank Knox, Sumner Welles, Robert Jackson, himself, and
several lesser officials and legal advisers on August 21, 1940, wherein they discussed
means of implementing the destroyers-for-bases deal. During the discussion, an
unidentified official suggested transferring the destroyers to Canada instead of Great
Britain as a subterfuge - an idea that gained enough support to irritate Stimson into
vocal opposition. The fact that the suggestion should even have been advanced,
Stimson wryly commented in his diary, "was an evidence of how technical stupidity
can get into these pleasant people." Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary (Aug. 21,
1940), supra note 235, at 2.
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assure you that we are not afraid of exploring anything within the law,
and we have a lawyer who will declare anything you want to be
legal."3 ' In fact, they usually arrived at their legal conclusions long
before doing any research at all.35
Yet, regardless of what his advisers told him, he was not
legally free to violate the national laws of neutrality, and he was not
free to lie to Congress about the level of aid he gave to the Allies. His
refusal to recognize obvious wars in violation of the spirit of the
neutrality laws; his unauthorized destroyers-for-bases exchange; his
unneutral aid in cash and planes to China, Britain, Finland, and other
states; his rerouting airplanes to Britain via Canada; his "currency
stabilizing" loans to belligerent states; his willful deception of
Congress and the public; and his many lesser unneutral acts of
economic or actual warfare359 violated international and national laws
of neutrality in a manner that showed nothing less than disrespect for
Congress and, in its worst manifestations, the American public and the
Constitution. In these fragile moments Roosevelt shed his leader's
mantle and donned the costume of a politician, in the pejorative sense
of the word.
There can be no question that, all told, Roosevelt's devious
circumvention of the neutrality laws and his disregard for international
law seemed prudent at the time. Strict neutrality was morally out of
... MILLER, supra note 17, at 327.
358 Interview with Myres S. McDougal, supra note 182; see also DEAN AcHESON,
MORNING AND NOON 161-88 (1965) (describing Roosevelt's ignoring Acheson's
sound legal advice for political purposes).
... According to T.R. Fehrenbach, for example, before declaring neutrality in the
German-British war, the Roosevelt Administration instructed U.S. Customs to delay
the departure of the German liner Bremen to allow a British cruiser, Betwick, to
intercept it. FEHRENBACH, supra note 6, at 32.
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the question for Roosevelt, except apparently with regard to Spain.3
Roosevelt identified the fate of China and Europe - particularly
Britain - as tightly knotted with the fate of the United States. The
fall of Britain and the other democracies would leave the United
States alone to defend freedom of the seas and the safety of the
western hemisphere. He could not reconcile the larger goals for
which he quested - justice and peace in Eurasia and their friendly
international relations with the United states - with the isolationist
sentiment of the times. Legally or not, he felt he would have to
persuade the American public to see how wrong isolationism was, for
he believed "the values for which, under his leadership, the United
States stood and which he advocated were those most conducive to
the advancement of peace and the general interests of humanity."
36
Selfish isolationism was not among these values. As he told Congress
in his heartfelt annual message of 1941, "principles of morality and
considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce
in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We
know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other
people's freedom.""36  On the other hand, the Roosevelt
administration had no real option to enter the war "cold turkey" given
the isolationist national mood, and little incentive to do so given the
early administration's limited knowledge of the extent of Nazi and
Japanese brutality and its belief that Britain and France could win
without the American troops. Had Roosevelt followed the strict
dictates of American law and historical constitutional practice, Europe
would almost certainly have succumbed to Hitler before Congress
took any action. Congress' unwieldy and uninformed grip on foreign
" Secretary Hull held the same contempt for the abdication of moral responsibility
that strict neutrality entails. See I HULL, supra note 7, at 408, 417.
361 WATT, supra note 143, at 125.
' Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress of Jan. 6, 194 1, reprinted in
PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES, supra note 91 at 663,667.
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policy impeded the government's intelligent and effective action and
finally brought the "survival of modem democracy into question."363
It would be easy to exonerate Roosevelt given the difficulties
of the situation and the comparatively brilliant way he handled it. As
Dean Acheson remarked: "At the top there are no easy choices. All
are between evils."'  Roosevelt was a man in an exceptionally serious
dilemma who nonetheless "refused to concede that any problem was
insoluable."365  Likewise, it would be easy to take a simplistic,
legalistic view like Borchard and Lage did,3" and condemn Roosevelt
for intentionally or knowingly violating the laws of neutrality, both
national and international, while maintaining immaculate rhetoric. The
fair judgment is subtler. The ends do not always justify the means, but
in Roosevelt's case they sometimes did. By declaring war earlier he
would have averted the deaths and destruction of the Pearl Harbor
massacre and perhaps have saved many lives and much priceless
property by winning the war earlier, but could he have salvaged his
reputation from the scorn of future generations as Wilson managed to
do only much later in history? Roosevelt valued his reputation,
political stature, and public support too much to let this happen.367
Conversely, by maintaining a strict neutrality the United States would
have washed its hands of all allies except the militarily feeble Latin
American countries, and might have isolated itself in the stranglehold
of a triple fascist victory in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Roosevelt
managed to avert both catastrophes quite imaginatively without major
permanent damage to the traditions of democracy or the rule of law
in the United States. On the other hand, many of the painful no-win
dilemmas Roosevelt faced could have been prevented had he planned
363 FEHRENBACH, supra note 6, at 163.
'(A DEAN AcmEsON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 22 (1987).
365 WELLES, supra note 3, at 77.
36 See generally BORCHARD & LAGE, supra note 1.
367 Cf. SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 177-78.
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more effectively and given strong leadership earlier. In the mid-1930s,
Roosevelt failed to answer effectively the harangues of the isolationist
minority and failed to educate the public about the real danger of the
fascists and the proposed isolationist response to their aggressions
s'1
Had he opposed the unnecessary neutrality in Spain, continually
educated the public, and used the bully pulpit like his Uncle Theodore,
he probably would have rendered much of his later deceptions
unnecessary.
Thus, he can be faulted for a tendency toward excessive
subterfuge and dishonesty, and for an unwillingness to take a
principled stand early enough and often enough. Despite a very loud
minority opposing all involvement with Europe, a majority of the
American public was willing to risk war in order to aid Britain even in
1940.369 A number of people, including some of Roosevelt's
intimates, advised him to go ahead with war much earlier and lead
public opinion rather than following it. General Robert E. Wood,
Acting Chairman of the Committee to Defend American by Aiding the
Allies, offered this honorable advice in an October, 1940 speech:
We have the anomalous situation of the polls showing
a majority of the people favoring a course that is
bound to get us into the war (increased aid to Britain),
while the same polls show 86 per cent of the same
people oppose actual entry into war .... The issue
should be honestly presented to the people. If we aid
Britain, short of war and beyond the limits of the
Neutrality Act, it ultimately means war and should
mean war. If we enter the war, we must enter it with
all our strength in men and money. That is the only
31 See ButRNs, supra note 7, at 255.
... See KIMBAL, supra note 11, at 126, 191-92.
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way to win a war.70
Winston Churchill warned rather testily in a September, 1941 speech
that:
Nothing is more dangerous in wartime than to live in
the termperamental atmosphere of a Gallup poll,
always feeling one's pulse and taking one's
temperature.... There is only one duty, only one safe
course, and that is to try to be right and not to fear to
do or say what you believe to be right.371
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, a trusted adviser and elder
statesman, relentlessly urged Roosevelt to provide leadership and
declare war, or at least to make clear to the public that war was
inevitable.3' He even sent Roosevelt "a rough imaginary resolution"
to send to Congress that would authorize the President to defend
American interests against aggressor nations using military force.373
Roosevelt always listened but never acted. Respected diplomat and
former Assistant Attorney General William J. Donovan publicly urged
Roosevelt to take a tough stand against the fascists: "In an age of
bullies we cannot afford to be a sissy. 374 Grenville Clark chided him
not to wait for an "incident" but to go directly to Congress to seek
370 LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 10, at 200 (quoting General Robert E. Wood).
37' Speech to Parliament on Sept. 30, 1941, reptinted in WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE
UNRELENTING STRUGGLE 272 (Charles Eade ed., 1942).
" Henry L. Stimson Manuscript Diary (Aug. 28, 1941; Sept. 25, 194 1), supra note
235.
373 Letter from Henry L. Sthnson, U.S. Secretary of War, to Roosevelt (May 24, 194 1)
(on file with Stimson Papers).
371 We May SendAfen, Says Col. Donovan, N.Y. TINEs, Nov. 12, 1939, at 41.
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authority for belligerent acts: "it is unworthy of a great nation to go
into a great war on... any basis except the decision of Congress, or
at least after placing the issue of active belligerency before Congress
and giving them the opportunity to pass on the issue." '375 A host of
congressional representatives, diplomats, and scholars continually
mounted convincing attacks against Roosevelt for his deceptiveness
and waffling; if the United States was going to take sides, they
justifiably claimed, a congressional declaration of war was in order. 76
In the end, they were right. Instead of deceiving the public and
Congress, Roosevelt should have taken early principled stands. Then,
if he lost anyway, when the isolationist predictions about "phony
wars" and harmless Nazis proved wrong, he could have used their
mistakes effectively to guide public sentiment. Instead, he
compromised first and deceived later. We may agree that the
difficulties of the moment excused his conduct, but we cannot say the
difficulties justified his conduct.
As Senator William Fulbright concluded in 1971, Roosevelt's
success in leading the nation into a successful and by all accounts just
war does not exonerate him from the harmful example he set.377 His
dishonesty in a good cause was a precedent for the dishonesty in bad
causes and flouting of the Constitution exhibited by later Presidents,
... Letter from Grenville Clark, Partner, Root Clark Buckner & Ballantine, to
Roosevelt (July 3, 1941), attachment, at 3-5 (on file with Stimson Papers).
376 See KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 129, 154-55, 178-79; see, e.g., 86 CONG. REC.
7651(1940) (statement of Sen. Homer Bone); SHOGAN, supra note 4, at 62 (quoting
Michigan Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg); Destroyer Sale Attacked by Nye,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1940, at 6 (quoting Sen. Gerald P. Nye as saying sale of
destroyers was equivalent to waging war); cf EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND
THE CONsTTrruTioN 29 (1947) (stating that Lend-Lease Act was at very least "a
qualified declaration of war.").
37 JOSEPH P. LASH, ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, 1939-1941, at 421 (1976).
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from Truman to Clinton.378 Roosevelt also worsened the imbalance
of powers between Congress and the Executive that the Founding
Fathers sought so ardently to avoid. In the crucible of twentieth
century political conflict, the President has too often emerged with his
feet firmly planted on territory allocated to Congress by the
Constitution. Roosevelt contributed more to that imbalance than
perhaps any other President in the history of the United States. Then
again, it is easy to lay blame on one so constantly under public
scrutiny even a half century after his death. Perhaps one should
absolve Roosevelt and blame the shortsightedness of his
contemporaries and the American public, who forced a great man
pursuing worthy ends to use less than noble - and less than legal -
methods.
3 Specifically, Clinton has been convincingly accused of unconstitutionally usurping
the powers of Congress by sending troops to Haiti - and thereby risking war -
without congressional approval. See Fisher, supra note 304, at xi, 154-57; Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements,
89 AM. J. Ir'LL. 58 (1995). He has also been accused of using troops in Somalia for
combat and attacking Bosnian Serbs without congressional approval. See FISHER,
supra note 304, at xi, 153-54, 159-60.
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